

STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. JOHN WILLIAM BINGHAM, Defendant-Appellant. 2008 Cited 0 times Court of Appeals of Iowa March 14, 2008
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 8-008 / 06-1563 Filed March 14, 2008
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JOHN WILLIAM BINGHAM, Defendant-Appellant
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Michael D. Huppert,
Judge.
The defendant appeals following his conviction for first-degree murder.
AFFIRMED.
Susan Stockdale, Colo, for appellant.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and David A dams, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Karen Doland, Assistant Attorney
General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Nan Horvat, Assistant County
Attorney, for appellee.
Heard by Mahan, P.J., and Eisenhauer and Baker, JJ. BAKER, J.
John Bingham appeals from his convic tion for first-degree murder. He

STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. JOHN WILLIAM BINGHAM, Defendant-Appellant.

2008 | Cited 0 times | Court of Appeals of Iowa | March 14, 2008

claims his confession was illegally obtained and should have been suppressed. He also claims the trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant his motion for new trial. We affirm.

Background Facts and Proceedings.

On the evening of August 17, 2004, De tective Judy Stanley of the Des Moines police department responded to a call directing her to go to the residence of Barbara Gaston. Upon gaining entry to the locked residence, Stanley and other officers discovered Gaston's body. Stanley learned from Gaston's neighbor that John Bingham, Gaston's nephew, also lived at the residence. After Bingham was later arrested following a high-spe ed chase, he was interviewed by police at the station. During that interview, Bingham initially denied any involvement in Gaston's death. However, he eventually admitted that he and Gaston had argued t hat day over his employment situation. He further admitted that he grabbed her by the neck, heard something crack, and dropped her to the floor. He then tried to make it look like an accident and left the house, proceeding to drink at three differ ent bars before being arrested. Following trial, the jury found Bingham guilty of first-degree murder. The court later sentenced him to life imprisonment without possibility of parole. Bingham appeals from this judgment and sentence.

Admissibility of Bi ngham's Confession.

Prior to trial, Bingham moved to suppress the statements made to police

a

STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. JOHN WILLIAM BINGHAM, Defendant-Appellant. 2008 | Cited 0 times | Court of Appeals of Iowa | March 14, 2008

during the interview. The district c ourt concluded Bingham had not voluntarily waived his Fifth Amendment right to counsel, and suppressed Bingham's

confession and any evidenc e resultantly obtained. The State sought and was granted discretionary review of this ruling. This court held that because (1) Bingham's invocation of his right to counsel was properly honored by police while it remained extant, (2) Bingham initiated conversation concerning the homicide investigation after he requested counsel, and (3) Bingham voluntarily waived his Fifth Amendment right to counsel, the c onfession and evidence obtained from the subsequent interrogation should not be suppressed. State v. Bingham, 715 N.W.2d 267, 274 (Iowa Ct. App. 2006). We t herefore reversed the district court's ruling on the motion to suppress and remanded for further proceedings. Id. At trial, the Stat e introduced the evidence Bingham had sought to suppress. Now on appeal from his conviction, Bingham again urges that the confession was obtained unc onstitutionally and should have been suppressed. We conclude that because this precise issue has alr eady been decided by this court, it constitutes the law of the case a nd cannot be relitigated in this appeal. In State v. Grosvenor, 402 N.W.2d 402, 405 (Iowa 1987), it was stated:

The doctrine of the law of the case represents the practice of courts to refuse to reconsider what has once been decided. It is a rule which provides that the legal principles announced and the views expressed by a reviewing court in an opinion, right or wrong, are binding throughout further progress of the case upon the litigants, the trial court and this court in later appeals. The principle is not applicable, however, if the facts before the court upon the second trial are materially different from those appearing upon the first.

(Citations omitted).

STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. JOHN WILLIAM BINGHAM, Defendant-Appellant. 2008 | Cited 0 times | Court of Appeals of Iowa | March 14, 2008

Bingham argues that State v. Harris, 741 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 2007), decided

by our supreme court after our earlier opin ion in this case, constitutes new law that would allow us to reconsider the i ssue. We find the facts and legal posture

of the present case to be entirely distinguishable from that in Harris, and that it does not entitle Bingham to a second bite of the apple. Accordingly, because we find that the facts before us in this a ppeal are identical to the first appeal, we therefore decline to address the issue a second time. Weight of the Evidence.

After the jury rendered its verdict, Bingham moved for a new trial, asserting the verdict was contrary to t he weight of the evidence. The court denied the motion, and no w on appeal Bingham challenges the weight of the evidence in regard to the elements of malice and malice aforethought. In particular, he argues he acted out of frustr ation and without the intent to kill her. Thus, he is guilty of no mo re than manslaughter.

We review the district court's denial of a motion for new trial for abuse of discretion. State v. Ellis , 578 N.W.2d 655, 659 (Iowa 199 8). When deciding such a motion, the district court is entit led to weigh the evid ence and consider the credibility of the witnesses. Id. at 658. If the court determines the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidenc e and a miscarriage of justice may have occurred, it is within the court's discretion to grant a new trial. Id. The weight-ofthe-evidence analysis is much broader than a sufficiency-of-the-evidence

STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. JOHN WILLIAM BINGHAM, Defendant-Appellant.

2008 | Cited 0 times | Court of Appeals of Iowa | March 14, 2008

analysis in that "it involves questions of credibility and refers to a determination that more credible evidence sup ports one side than the other." State v. Nitcher ,

720 N.W.2d 547, 559 (Iowa 2006). Only in the extraordinar y case, where the

evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict, should a district court lessen the jury's role as the primary trier of fact and invoke its power to grant a new trial.

State v. Shanahan , 712 N.W.2d 121, 135 (Iowa 2006).

In order to prove first-degree mur der, the State must establish the defendant acted with deliber ation and premeditation, in addition to malice aforethought. State v. Reeves , 636 N.W.2d 22, 25 (I owa 2001). Malice aforethought is a fixed purpos e or design to do some physical harm to another which exists prior to t he act being committed. See State v. Artzer , 609 N.W.2d 526, 529 (Iowa 2000). It does not need to ex ist for any specific time before the act occurs, and it can be inferred from the use of a weapon. Id. at 530. Premeditation is defined as "to think or ponder upon the matter before acting." State v. Buenaventura , 660 N.W.2d 38, 48 (Iowa 2003). Neither malice aforethought nor premeditation is required to "exist for any particular length of time." Id. at 49.

The acts to which Bingham confessed reflect a degree of premeditation and deliberateness. When he returned home late in the evening Bingham found the door locked. Rather than retreating, he kicked th e door down and barged in. He then knocked the phone out of Gaston's hand as she was attempting to alert

a

STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. JOHN WILLIAM BINGHAM, Defendant-Appellant.

2008 | Cited 0 times | Court of Appeals of Iowa | March 14, 2008

police to his intrusion. Afterwards, he grabbed her by the neck and pushed her to the ground as she was attempting to fl ee from him. Moreover, the actual injuries and manner of death indicate the presence of malice. Gaston was manually strangled and suffered a broken hy oid bone. The medical examiner testified that compression of the neck for between thirty seconds and one minute is required to cause death by strangulation. Our review of the record convinces us the evidence does not preponderate heavily against the verdict and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to grant Bingham 's motion for new

trial.

AFFIRMED.