



Hoye v. Gilmore et al

2016 | Cited 0 times | W.D. Virginia | June 20, 2016

CHARLES T. HOYE,

Plaintiff, V. LT. GILMORE, et al. ,

Defendant.

CLERK'S OFFICE . U . 9 DISTRICT COURT

AT ROANOKE, VA . 1 FILED IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 j 2g s JUN FOR
THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

ROANOKE DIVISION Juul Ac. LER

BY:

DE E Civil Action No. 7:15-cv-00203

MEMORANDUM OPINION By: Hon. Michael F. Urbansld

United States District Judge Plaintiff Charles T. Hoye, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro K, commenced this civil action pursuant to 42 U. S. C. j 1983. Plaintiff alleges that the Coffeewood Correctional Center (CCC) and Virginia Department of Corrections (\$ VDOC) as defendants. Plaintiff alleges in this action that his transfer from CCC to Deep Meadow Correctional Center (C t DMCC) was retaliatory and frustrated the ability of his children to visit and communicate with him. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, and Plaintiff responded with a ç i motion to nendy ' ' asking the court to consider exhibits in support of the second amended complaint. After considering the motions, the court grants Plaintiff's motion to nend in part and grants Defendant's motion to dlsml ss.

1. Plaintiff, a Jewish inmate suffering from diabetes, was housed at CCC 9om his initial entry into the VDOC in 2009 until his transfer to DMCC on January 14, 2015. While at CCC in August 2013, Plaintiff began filing administrative grievances to complain that the VDOC's Common Fare Menu did not accommodate both his religious and medical needs. Staff responded, advising Plaintiff to choose a diet that satisfied his medical needs (a non- Kosher diet) or his religious needs (a sugary diet).



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Unsatisfied, Plaintiff commenced an action in state court pursuant to the Virginia Declaratory Judgment Act, Virginia Code § 8.01-184. Thereafter, defendants Gourdi and

Martin §§ immediately suspended Plaintiff from the Common Fare Menu, and CCC staff instituted an allegedly false institutional disciplinary action against him.

In April 2014, Plaintiff commenced a civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in this court. Hoye v. Clarke, No. 7:14-cv-00124, against defendants Lt. Gilmore, Martin, Gotlrdine and others. § Promptly after service of process was ordered in that case, defendants Hillian and Gourdi instantly cited CCC security staff to prevent Plaintiff from using the prison's library. Accordingly, Plaintiff sought to join Hillian as a defendant to the federal action and filed a regular grievance on January 7, 2015, to regain access to the library. Two days later on January 9, 2015, Defendants allegedly requested that Plaintiff be transferred from CCC to DMCC with the specific condition Plaintiff never be allowed to return to CCC. Defendant Dawkins approved the request the same day, and Plaintiff was transferred from CCC to DMCC five days later on January 14, 2015.

Plaintiff filed an internal complaint, complaining that the transfer was retaliatory in violation of VDOC policies. Defendant Hillian replied, noting the transfer was deemed necessary for the well-being of DOC. Defendant Lt. Gilmore replied to Plaintiff's regular grievance, noting the transfer was § necessary for the orderly operation of the facility. Defendant Parks replied to Plaintiff's grievance appeal, stating the transfer was § for purposes of managing the prison population. §

Before the transfer to DMCC, Plaintiff's ex-wife was able to bring Plaintiff's young daughters from Fairfax, Virginia, to CCC every two months, and Plaintiff was able to frequently call his daughters. After the transfer, however, visiting §§ has become practically impossible due to the distances and the increased cost of long-distance phone charges adds to § his already the children's sense of isolation from each other and to the detriment of both. §

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Plaintiff claims that Defendants §§ unlawfully § tortiously alienated and deprived his daughters § of parental consortium with Plaintiff. The remaining two claims allege that Defendants conspired to cause, and did cause, a retaliatory transfer in violation of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution; Article 1, section 12 of the Virginia Constitution; and VDOC Operating Procedure 866.1.

II. In response to Defendants' motion to dismiss, Plaintiff filed a § motion for leave to amend or, in the alternative, to supplement the second amended complaint with a request for judicial



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' ' d a mot i on t o Sl e a r e s p o n s e o u t o f t i m e. l P l a i n t i f f a c k n o w l e d g e s n o t i c e o f a d j u d i c a t i v e f a c t s a l l t h a t t h e p r o p o s e d t h i r d a m e n d e d c o m p l a i n t d o e s n o t a d d a n y c a u s e o f a c t i o n o r j o i n a n e w p a r t y. I n s t e a d, h e m e r e l y w i s h e s t h e c o u r t t o c o n s i d e r t h e p r o p o s e d e x h i b i t s i n s u p p o r t o f t h e c o m p l a i n t a n d i n o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s. A c c o r d i n g l y, t h e c o u r t g r a n t s t h e m o t i o n s t o t h e e x t e n t i t w i l l c o n s i d e r t h e e x h i b i t s i n a d j u d i c a t i n g t h e m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s.

111. The court must dismiss an action or claim filed by an inmate if the court determines that the action or claim is frivolous or fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U. S. C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A(b)(1); 42 U. S. C. § 1997e(c). The first standard includes claims based upon "legal" or "factual" legal theory, "or claims of infringement of a legal interest which clearly does not exist, or claims where the factual contentions are clearly baseless." *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U. S. 319, 327 (1989). The second standard is the "familiar" standard for a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), accepting a plaintiff's factual allegations as true. A complaint needs "a short and plain statement of the claim showing

1 Defendant did not oppose either motion.

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t h a t t h e p l e a d e r i s e n t i t l e d t o r e l i e f' a n d s u f f i c i e n t c o n c l u s i o n s . . . t o r a i s e a r i g h t t o r e l i e f a b o v e t h e s p e c u l a t i v e l e v e l . . . ' ' B e l l A t l . C o p. v. T w o m b l y, 550 U. S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). A plaintiff's basis for relief requires more than labels and conclusions. . . . ' ' I d. Therefore, a plaintiff must set forth facts sufficient to state all the elements

' ' 2 B E I Dupont de Nemours & Co

., 324 F. 3d 761 765 (4th Cir. 2003). of (the) claim. as v. . . , To state a First Amendment § 1983 retaliation claim, a plaintiff must establish three elements: (1) the plaintiff's right to speak was protected; (2) the defendant's alleged retaliatory act or action adversely affected the plaintiff's constitutionally protected speech; and (3) a causal relationship existed between the plaintiff's speech and the defendant's retaliatory action. *Suarez Com. Indus. v. McGraw*, 202 F. 3d 676, 685- 86 (4th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).

Filing grievances cannot form the basis of a retaliation claim in this circuit because, pursuant to *Adams v. Rice*, 40 F. 3d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1994), § 1983 there is no constitutional right to

' ' 3 Furthermore

, I § there is no constitutional right to prison participation in grievance proceedings.



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2 D t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r a c o m p l a i n t s t a t e s a p l a u s i b l e c l a i m f o r r e l i e f i s < \$ a c o n t e x t - s p e c i f i c t a s k t h a t r e q u i r e s t h e r e v i e w i n g c o u r t t o d r a w o n i t s j u d i c i a l e x p e r i e n c e a n d c o m m o n s e n s e . ' ' A s h e r o f t v . l g b a l , 556 U. S. 662, 678- 79 (2009) . T h u s , a c o u l ' t s c r e e n i n g a c o m p l a i n t u n d e r R u l e 1 2 (b) (6) c a n i d e n t i f y p l e a d i n g s t h a t a r e n o t e n t i t l e d t o a n a s s u m p t i o n o f t n l t h b e c a u s e t h e y c o n s i s t o f n o m o r e t h a n l a b e l s a n d c o n c l u s i o n s . I d . A l t h o u g h t h e c o u r t l i b e r a l l y c o n s t r u e s o r o K c o m p l a i n t s , H a i n e s v . K e r n e r , 404 U. S. 519, 520- 2 1 (1972), t h e c o m ' t d o e s n o t a c t a s a n i n m a t e ' s a d v o c a t e , s u a s p o n t e d e v e l o p i n g s t a t u t o r y a n d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c l a i m s n o t c l e a r l y r a i s e d i n ' a c o m p l a i n t . S e e B r o c k v . C a r r o l l , 107 F. 3d 241, 243 (4t h C i r . 1997) (L u t t i g , J . , c o n c u r r i n g); B e a u d e t t v . C i t v o f H a m o t o n , 775 F. 2d 1 274, 1 278 (4t h C i r . 1985) ; s e e a l s o G o r d o n v . L e e k e , 57 4 F. 2d 1 1 47, 1 1 51 (4t h C i r . 1978) (r e c o g n i z i n g t h a t a d i s t r i c t c o u r t i s n o t e x p e c t e d t o a s s u m e t h e r o l e o f a d v o c a t e f o r a p r o K p l a i n t i f g . .

3 S Booker v

. S. C. Dep' t of Cor r . 58 3 F. App' x 43 44 (4t h C i r . 201 4) (u n p u b l i s h e d) (r e v e r s i n g a p a n t o f e e y , s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t o n a n i n m a t e ' s F i r s t A m e n d m e n t r e t a l i a t i o n c l a i m w h e r e t h e i n m a t e a l l e j e d p r i s o n o f t k i a l s r e t a l i a t e d v i a a d i s c i p l i n a r y c h a r g e f o r h i s g r i e v a n c e a b o u t m a i l b u t , n o t a b l y , o f f e r e d n o o p i n l o n w h e t h e r t h e i n m a t e ' s g r i e v a n c e w a s p r o t e c t e d s p e e c h); b u t s e e W r i g h t v . V i t a l e , N o . 91- 7539, 1991 U. S. App. LEXIS 15230, a t * 2, 1991 WL 1 27597, a t # 1 (4t h C i r . J u l y 1 6, 1 991) (u n p u b l i s h e d) (i n d i c a t i n g t h a t a n i n m a t e ' s c l a i m a b o u t l o s t v i s i t a t i o n p r i v i l e g e s i n r e t a l i a t i o n f o r f i l i n g g r i e v a n c e s S s c o u l d s t a t e a c o n s t i m t i o n a l c l a i m ' ' (c i t i n g o t h e r a p p e l l a t e c o u r t s ' o p i n i o n s l l ; G u l l e t v . W i l t , N o . 88- 6797, 1989 U. S. App. LEXIS 21 274, a t * 4- 5, 1989 WL 1 4614, a t * 2 (4t h C i r . F e b . 21, 1989) (u n p u b l i s h e d) (n o t i n g a n i n m a t e ' s F i r s t A m e n d m e n t r i g h t s w e r e i m p l i c a t e d b y h i s c i c l a i m t h a t h e i s b e i n g t r a n s f e r r e d (t o a n o t h e r p r i s o n) b e c a u s e p r i s o n o f f i c i a l s a r e r e t a l i a t i n g f o r (h i s l n u m e r o u s i n s t i t u t i o n a l p i e v a n c e s , ' ' b u t c o n c l u d e d t h a t h e d i d n o t s t a t e a c l a i m b e c a u s e t h e p r i s o n h a d l e g i t i m a t e , n o n - r e t a l i a t o r y r e a s o n s f o r t h e t r a n s f e r (c i t i n g o t h e r a p p e l l a t e c o u r t s ' o p i n i o n s l) ; s e e a l s o C o l l i n s v . P o n d C r e e k M i n i n a C o . , 468 F. 3d 213, 219 (4t h C i r . 2006) (r e c o g n i z i n g t h a t u n p u b l i s h e d d e c i s i o n a r e n o t a f f o r d e d p r e c e d e n t i a l v a l u e a n d G s a r e e n t i t l e d o n l y t o t h e w e i g h t t h e y g e n e r a t e b y t h e p e r s u a s i v e n e s s o f t h e i r r e a s o n i n g o); H o c a n v . C a r t e r , 85 F. 3d 1 1 13, 1 1 18 (4t h C i r .

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v i s i t a t i o n , e i t h e r f o r p r i s o n e r s o r v i s i t o r s . ' ' R i t e v . K e l l e r , 438 F. Supp. 1 10, 1 15 (D. Md. 1977) , a f f d , 588 F. 2d 913 (4t h C i r . 1978) . P l a i n t i f f a c k n o w l e d g e s h e i s a l l o w e d t o p a y f o r p h o n e c a l l s , a n d h e d o e s n o t h a v e t h e r i g h t t o f r e e o r t m f e t t e r e d t e l e p h o n e u s e . S e e e . g . , B e z l e l v . G r a m m e r , 869 F. 2d 1105, 1108 (8t h C i r . 1989) .

A c c o r d i n g l y , D e f e n d a n t s ' m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s m u s t b e g r a n t e d t o t h e e x t e n t P l a i n t i f f s p r e s e n t s a c l a i m o f r e t a l i a t i o n b a s e d o n f i l i n g a d m i n i s t r a t i v e g r i e v a n c e s , v i s i t a t i o n , o r c û m o r e e x p e n s i



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ve' ' phone calls. However, the court will assume the existence of the first element as to the slinging of the federal and state lawsuits because (c) the slinging of lawsuits signifies a constitutional protection, implicating the First Amendment right to petition the government for redress of grievances, and the right of access to courts. ' ' Am. Civil Liberties Union Inc. v. Wikimedia Conty., 999 F. 2d 780, 785 (4th Cir. 1993).

For the second element, § 8(a) plaintiff suffers adverse action if the defendant's allegedly retaliatory conduct would likely deter a person of ordinary firmness from the exercise of (the protected rights. ' ' Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F. 3d 474, 500 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This objective inquiry examines the specific facts of each case, taking into account the actors involved and their relationships. *Balt. Sun Co. v. Ehrlich*, 437 F. 3d 410, 416 (4th Cir. 2006). Because K's conduct that tends to chill the exercise of constitutional rights might not itself deprive such rights, . . . a plaintiff need not actually be deprived of . . . First Amendment rights in order to establish First Amendment retaliation. ' ' Nonetheless, if the plaintiff's actual response to the retaliatory conduct provides

1996) Since the published opinions are not even regarded as binding precedent in other circuits, such opinions cannot be considered in deciding whether particular conduct violates the clearly established law for purposes of a judgment in the element to qualify for immunity).

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some evidence of the tendency of that conduct to chill First Amendment activity. ' ' Constantine, 411 F. 3d at 500.

§ 8 Not every (government restriction, ' ' however, is sufficient to chill the exercise of First Amendment rights, nor is every restriction actionable, even if retaliatory. ' ' *Di Meglio v. Haines*, 45 F. 3d 790, 806 (4th Cir. 1995). Illustrating the observation that ' ' Not every government restriction is ' sufficient to chill the exercise of First Amendment rights, ' ' we have recognized a distinction between an adverse impact that is actionable, on the one hand, and a 'equally' minor inconvenience, on the other. : 1 (A) plaintiff seeking to recover for retaliation must show that the defendant's conduct resulted in something more than a 'equally' minor inconvenience' to her exercise of First Amendment rights. ' ' Constantine, 411 F. 3d at 500 (citations omitted). Thus, in *Wikimedia Conty.*, we held that a prison's ' decision to withdraw from its special arrangement (pennit to an ACLU paralegal to meet with prisoners in private) . . . may have inconvenienced Appellees, but it did not chill, impair, or deny their exercise of First Amendment rights' ' because the paralegal was still ' free to visit with inmates in a secure, non-contact meeting rooms, ' ' which was ' ' all that the prison provided to any paralegal or other non-professional visitor. ' ' 999 F. 2d at 786. In a proximate vein, the



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Supreme Court has condoned limitation on liability when the challenged government action, whether conduct or speech, is so pervasive, mundane, and universal in government operations that allowing a plaintiff to proceed on his retaliation claim would "plant the seed of a constitutional case" in "virtually every" interchange. See *Cozmick v. Myers*, 461 U. S. 138, 148-49 (1983); see also *id.* at 143 (holding that, in the government employment context, public employers can reprimand or punish employees for their speech when that speech does not touch on matters of public concern); *Kirby v. City of Elizabeth City*, 388 F. 3d 440, 448-49 (4th Cir. 2004); *P...f*, *Umbel* 518 U. S. at 675 (noting that retaliation claims may be justified, e.g., "mact ionable when legitimate motives involving government interests are sufficiently strong"). Thus, the Connick Court recognized that the retaliation claim must be administered to balance governmental and private interests so as not to impose liability in everyday, non-of-the-mill encounters. *Illustrious* at 143 (observing that not "every restriction on speech is actionable, even if retaliatory," we have recognized that some government actions, due to their nature, are not actionable even if they satisfy all the generally articulated elements of a retaliation claim. *Balt. Sun Co.*, 437 F. 3d at 416-17.

Plaintiff fails to allege any burden whatsoever to his ability to access courts due to the transfer, and the court does not find that a transfer from CCC to DMCC would chill the exercise of constitutional rights of an objectively reasonable plaintiff. See *Consantine*, 411 F. 3d at 500 (noting a plaintiff's actual response to the retaliation or conduct is indicative of a chill to the protected activity). Plaintiff was transferred in between two Security Level 2 facilities, both of

' Central Region. 4 Plaintiff was not transferred to a more restrictive which are within the VDOC serving environment with fewer privileges so as to deter a person of ordinary firmness from

5 The VDOC's transfer of inmates between comparable Virginia correctional pursuing litigation. facilities in the same region is such a pervasive, mundane, and universal practice in its operations that allowing Plaintiff to proceed on his particular retaliation claim would plant the seed of a constitutional case in virtually every prison transfer between comparable prisons. Furthermore, Plaintiff cannot have a justifiable expectation that he would be incarcerated at CCC or any particular prison for the duration of his sentence. See, e.g., *Meachum v. Fano*, 427 U. S. 215, 224 (1976); see also *Oliver v. Walden*, 461 U. S. 238, 245 (1983) ("Even when... the transfer involves long distances and an ocean crossing, the confinement remains within constitutional

4 The court takes judicial notice of these prisons' security levels and locations.

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA- DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS - FACILITIES, <http://vadoc.virginia.gov/facilities/> (last visited May 6, 2016); see *In Re Katrina Canal Breaches* Consol. Litig., 533 E. Supp. 2d 615, 631-33 & M. 14-15 (E. D. La. 2008) (collecting cases indicating that federal courts may take judicial notice of government websites)



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; Williams v. Long, 585 F. Supp. 2d 1679, 686-88 & n. 4 (D. Md. 2008) (collecting cases indicating that postings on government websites are inherently authentic or self-authenticating). The two prisons are approximately seventy miles apart, comparable to the distance between Frederick and Richmond, Virginia.

5 In Hill v.

Laopin, 630 F.3d 468, 475 (6th Cir. 2010), the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that a transfer to a more restrictive segregative unit could constitute the adverse action to state a retaliatory claim. However, Plaintiff does not allege similar circumstances. In Pasley v. Conerly, No. 08-13185, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104763, 2010 WL 3906120 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 10, 2010), a magistrate judge concluded that an "adverse action" included corrective staff's threat, internally, to transfer an inmate to a Michigan prison near Detroit to "set up North" away from his family. After the inmate threatened to file a petition. The district court adopted the report and recommendation because it believed such a threat could deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising, in that circuit, the constitutional right to file prison petitions. Id., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104697, 2010 WL 3894044 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 30, 2010). However, Pasley is not precedent in this circuit, and opinions issued from other circuits do not determine clearly established law for qualified immunity in the Fourth Circuit. Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 251 (4th Cir. 1999).

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limits. The difference between such a transfer and an intrastate or interstate transfer of short distance is a matter of degree, not of kind, and Meachum instructs that "the determining factor is the nature of the interest involved rather than its weight."').

Moreover, Plaintiff has described only a "minimal" inconvenience to his and his children's ability to meet or communicate. See Constantine, 411 F.3d at 500 (noting a plaintiff must show that the defendant's conduct resulted in something more than a "minimal" inconvenience to the exercise of First Amendment rights) (internal quotation marks omitted). No statute prevents the Plaintiff and his family from communicating or meeting; Plaintiff may receive visitors and may pay for out-of-pocket telephone calls. The fact it takes slightly longer for the children to arrive at DMCC or it costs Plaintiff more money to call are not sufficiently "adverse" circumstances to pursue a retaliatory claim, even if he had a constitutional right to visitation or less expensive telephone calls. Accordingly, Defendants' motion to dismiss must be granted for these claims.

IV. To the extent Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated the VDOC's policies or procedures, a claim that prison officials have not followed their own independent policies or procedures also does not state a constitutional claim. See United States v. Caceras, 440 U.S. 741, 752-55 (1978);



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Ricci v. Chertoff, 544 U.S. 147, 156 (2005) (holding that if state law grants more procedural rights than the Constitution requires, a state's failure to abide by that law is not a federal due process issue). The court 't declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction on over any state-law claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

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V. For the foregoing reasons, the court grants Plaintiff's motion to amend in part and also grants Defendant's motion to dismiss. Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction is denied as moot.

ENTER: This day of June, 2016. / s /

United States District Judge

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