



Estrella v. Commissioner of Social Security

2016 | Cited 0 times | S.D. Florida | July 27, 2016

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA CASE NO. 15-22890- CI V- MOORE/ MCALILEY NIURKA ESTRELLA,

Plaintiff,

CAROLYN COLVIN, COMMISSIONER of SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant .

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION Pending before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (DE 201, and Defendant 's Motion for Summary Judgment. g DE 211. The Honorable K. Michael Moore referred the motions to me and they are fully briefed. (DE 3, 231. For the reasons set forth below, I recommend that the Court grant Plaintiff's motion and deny Defendant's motion. 1. Overview

Plaintiff applied income on November 15, 2011, alleging an onset of disability on January 15, 2010. Tr.

1 Hlitation was initially denied on January 13, 2012, and on reconsideration 209 - 18. er app on February 2012. Tr. 118- 29, 137-48. Plaintiff requested a hearing before an

for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security

1 Citations to the transcript of proceedings before the Social Security Administration, which was filed at DE 14, are to ' \$ Tr. (#j ' ' .

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), which took place on November 4, 2013, and at which Plaintiff and Steven Bast , a vocational expert , testified. Tr. 37- 61, 153-5.

On February 2014, the ALJ issued a decision finding that Plaintiff is not disabled. Tr. 18-31. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review of the ALJ's decision, Tr. 1-11, making that decision the final decision of the Commissioner. Plaintiff now asks this benests, or alternately remand with instructions

Court to either remand the matter to the ALJ for an award of



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2 A .

Tr. 43. Plaintiff went to medical school in Cuba at

2 pl aint if f test if ied wi t h the assi stance of a Spanish i nt emret er. 3 i ti mes duri ng the heari ng, t he i nt erpret er transl ated Plai nt iff as ref erri ng t o her At var ous art ner as her ç i mate' ' her S s husband' ' or her i t boyfri end. ' ' The record is not cl ear regardi ng thei r P , l egal relati onshi p. For t he sake of consi st ency, the Court uses t he t erm d t partner. ' '

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Plaintiff takes Cymbalta, Abilify, Alprazolam, Pomoate, Percocet, Flexeril, and Topiramate. Tr. 45-6. At the time of the hearing,

Temazepam, Hydroxyzine

Plaintiff had not worked for 5 years. Her last job was translating patient charts from English to Spanish with the help of a dictionary, although she was fired because she did not have sufficient knowledge of the English language. Tr. 46-7. After leaving that position, Plaintiff underwent gastric bypass surgery. Tr. 47. Because of her depression, she had not searched for work in the prior four years. 1d.



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She began treatment with a psychiatrist for depression a number of months after she was fired. Tr. 48. Her symptoms include lack of sexual drive, loss of interest, lack of concentration, impaired memory, shaking, tremors, anxiety, panic attacks, and fatigue. Tr. 48. She experiences up to three panic attacks a week and they last about 10 minutes. 1d. Plaintiff maintains a blog about Cuban politics that she updates daily; the updates take

a few minutes. Tr. 52-3.

Physically, radiates downward to the legs, causing numbness, and making it difficult for her to squat. Tr. 50. Without pain medication, her pain is at an 8.5 on a scale of 10., with the

Plaintiff suffers from back pain in the sacral lumbar area. The pain

medication, it is a 6 or 7. Tr. 51. She can walk for one block, and stand in a fixed position for five minutes before her leg pain forces her to move. 1d. She cannot pick objects off the floor, or pick up anything heavier than a paper file. Tr. 52.

The ALJ questioned Plaintiff about a report prepared by a consultant, a physical therapist, who examined Plaintiff and opined that she was exaggerating her physical symptoms. Tr. 49. Plaintiff testified that the consultant did not conduct any diagnostics or, to her knowledge, review any of her medical records. Rather, he performed a cursory physical examination that lasted less than 5 minutes. Tr. 49-50.

B. The Vocational Expert's (VE) testimony At the hearing, the ALJ asked the VE to assume a hypothetical person who was

a person of the Claimant's age, education, and work history. Further assume that this individual has the residual functional capacity to perform a partial range of light work. Specifically assume the individual can lift, carry, push or pull up to 10 pounds frequently and 20 pounds occasionally; the individual can sit for up to six hours total in an eight-hour workday. She can stand and walk for up to six hours total in an eight-hour workday. The individual can occasionally climb ramps and stairs, but can never climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds. The individual can occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch or crawl. The individual is limited to occupations in which she would not be exposed to workplace hazards that include but are not limited to working in proximity to moving mechanical parts, working in proximity to high exposed places, or working around other hazards that are not readily apparent. The individual is further limited to the basic demands of unskilled work, and by that I mean an individual who can understand, remember and carry out short and simple instructions. The individual can respond appropriately to supervision. The individual can interact appropriately with coworkers, and she can respond to changes in routine work settings. This individual is further limited to occupations involving not more than occasional interaction with supervisors,



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coworkers or the public.

And lastly, the individual is limited to occupations in which the principal measure of performance is not based on production quotas or production goals. Tr. 56-7. The VE testified that a hypothetical person with these limitations would not be able to do Plaintiff's prior work; but could be employed in unskilled jobs that exist in Florida and the national economy. Tr. 57-8. However, if the hypothetical person could be expected to miss more than one day of work a month, this would place her within the almost unemployable zone ' Tr. 59.

In response to questioning by Plaintiff's attorney, the VE testified that if the hypothetical claimant also had the non-exertional impairment found in the medical assessment prepared by Plaintiff's psychiatrist, she would not be able to work in any job.

59. The VE also testified that if the hypothetical claimant had only the physical impairment found in a medical assessment prepared by Plaintiff's treating physician she would not be able to work. Tr. 60-1.

C. The record before the ALJ includes Plaintiff's medical records evidence, which medical records

the Court has carefully reviewed. I address the medical record evidence as it is relevant to the issues addressed below.

D. The ALJ's decision As noted, in his written decision, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff is not disabled. Tr. 18- 31. The ALJ first found that Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful

activity since January 1, 2012, to the date of the decision. Tr. 20. Next, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has

1, 2012, thus the decision addresses the period commencing

the severe impairment of depressive disorder, anxiety disorder, and degenerative disc disease, but she does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. Tr. 20-1.

The ALJ then determined Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity to perform a partial range of light work. Tr. 24. Specifically, the ALJ found Plaintiff can:



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si t f or up t o si x hours i n an ei ght hour workday. She can st and and/ or wal k f or up t o si x hours i n an ei ght hour wor kday. She can l i ft , car ry, pus h and/ or pul l up t o 10 pounds f requent ly and 20 pounds occasi onal ly. The cl ai mant can occasi onal ly st oop, kncel , crouch and/ or crawl . She can occasi onal ly cl i mb ramps and st ai rs. However, she can never: (1) cl i mb l adders, ropes, or s caff ol ds; (i i) wor k i n proxi mi ty t o movi ng, mechani cal par t s; (i i i) wor k i n proxi mi ty t o hi gh exposed pl aces; or (i v) be exposed t o ot her wor kpl ace hazards t hat are not r eadi ly apparent. I n addi ti on, t he cl ai mant i s l i mi t ed t o occupat i ons whi ch requi re no mor e t han t he basi c demands of uns ki l l ed wor k i n t hat she can; (i) under st and, remember, and car ry out short and si mpl e i ns t ruct i ons; (i i) r espond appropri at el y t o super vi si on; (i i i) i nt eract appr opri at el y wi t h co- wor kers; and (i v) r espond appropri at el y t o changes i n r out i ne work set t i ngs. The cl ai mant i s f urt her l i mi t ed t o occupati ons i n whi ch t he pr i nci pal measure of per for mance i s not based on product i on quot as or product i on goal s. Fi nal ly, t he cl ai mant i s l i mi t ed t o occupat i ons i n whi ch she has onl y occasi onal i nt eract i on wi t h super vi sors, co- worker s and t he publ i c. Tr. 24- 5. The ALJ al so found t hat Pl ai nt i ff i s not abl e t o communi cat e i n Engl i s h. Tr. 29. Appl yi ng t hese l i mi t at i ons, t he ALJ found t hat Pl ai nt i ff cannot perfor m her past rel evant work, but i s not di sabl ed because she i s capabl e of perfor mi ngot her jobs exi st i ng i n si gni fi cant numbers i n t he nat i onal economy. Tr. 28-30. 111. Anal ysi s

I n eval uat i ng a cl ai m f or di sabi l i ty benef i t s, t he ALJ mus t f ol l ow t he f i ve s t eps set f ort h i n 20 C. F. R. jj 416. 9204a) and 404. 1520:

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1. I s t he cl ai mant perfor mi ng subst ant i al gai nful act i vi ty? I f not , t he ALJ next det ermi nes;
2. Does t he cl ai mant have one or more sever e i mpai rment ? I f t he cl ai mant does, t he ALJ next consi ders;
3. Does t he cl ai mant have a s evere i mpai rment t hat meets or equal s an i mpai rment speci fi cal ly l i st ed i n 20 C. F. R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendi x 1? I f so, cl ai mant i s di sabl ed; i f not , t he ALJ must det er mi ne cl ai mant' s RFC; and t hen det er mi ne;
4. Based on t he RFC, can cl ai mant perfor m her past r el evant work? I f so, s he i s not di sabl ed. I f she cannot per f or m her past r el evant work, t he ALJ must t snal ly det er mi ne;
5. Whet her, based on her age, educat i on, and wor k exper i ence, and t he RFC, can cl ai mant perfor m ot her work of t he sort found i n t he nat i onal economy. I f s o, cl ai mant i s not di sabl ed. I f not , cl ai mant i s di sabl ed and ent i t l ed t o benef i t s. Phi l l i ps v. Barnhart , 357 F. 3d 1232, 1237 (1 t h Ci r. 2004).

I n revi ewi ng t he ALJ' S deci si on, t he Court mus t consi der t he r ecor d as whol e and det ermi ne



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whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standard, and whether his findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence in the record. *Powers v. Heckler*, 738 F.2d 1151, 1152 (11th Cir. 1984). If substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance. It is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion. ' ' Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1240, n. 8 (citation omitted). The substantial evidence standard does not permit a reviewing court to consider only those parts of the record that support the ALJ; it must view the entire record and also consider evidence which detracts from the evidence relied on by the ALJ. *Mackie v. Astrue*, No. 1:07-cv-00098-MP-WCS, 2008 WL 719210, at #1 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 2008).

While the Court applies a presumption in favor of the ALJ's finding of fact, no such presumption applies to the ALJ's legal conclusions. Thus, the Court must reverse if the ALJ incorrectly applied the law, or if the decision fails to provide the court with sufficient reasoning to determine whether the law was properly applied. *Perez v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.*, No. 6:06-CV-1648-ORL-19KRS, 2008 WL 191036, *5 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 22, 2008). The ALJ's failure to specify the weight given to evidence contrary to his decision, or failure to give the reason for discrediting evidence, is reversible error. *Hart v. Astrue*, No. 3:10-cv-531-J-TEM, 2011 WL 4356149, #5 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 19, 2011). The Court is authorized to enter a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the ALJ, with or without remand. *Perez*, 2008 WL 191036, *5; 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

Some of the ALJ's findings here are not in dispute. There is no dispute that Plaintiff has not engaged Moreover, Plaintiff does not dispute that her impairments or combination of impairments do not meet or medically equal any of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. Rather, Plaintiff challenges:

in substantial gainful employment since January 1, 2012.

(1) the ALJ's failure to weight the medical opinions of Dr. Polanco, (2) the weights given to the medical opinions of two treating physicians, and (3) the ALJ's credibility assessment of Plaintiff. g DE 20, pp. 6-221. Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ's error resulted in a RFC that is not supported by substantial evidence, and that the application of that RFC resulted in the incorrect determination that she is not disabled.

The RFC is an assessment by the ALJ of a claimant's ability to work despite her impairments. *Lewis v. Callahan*, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997). In determining

the RFC, the ALJ must consider all the relevant evidence. 1d. The focus of the RFC is on doctors' evaluations of the claimant's condition and the medical consequences thereof. Tillman

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v. Comm. o fsoc. Sec. , Case No. 6: 12-cv- 969-Or 1 - 22DAB, 2013 WL 4014979, *3 (Aug. 6, 2013 M. D. Fl a). 1 f i nd t hat t he ALJ' S deci si on does not pr ovi de suf f i ci ent r eas oni ng t o support t he RFC and 1 t heref ore recommnd t hat t he Court remand t hi s mat t er for f urt her consi derat i on.

A. The ALJ erred i n wei ghing the medi cal opinions Pl ai nt i f f chal l enges t he wei ght gi ven by t he ALJ t o t he opi ni ons of some of her t r eat i ng physi ci ans and t he St at e consul t at i ve physi ci ans. E DE 20, pp. 6-151. ç û g - l - l he ALJ must st at e wi t h part i cul ari t y t he wei ght gi ven t o di f ferent medi cal opi ni ons and t he reasons t herefor. ' ' Wi nschel v. Commi ssi oner o f Soci al k vccz / rf / - p, 63 1 F. 3d 1 176, 1 179 (1 1 t h Ci r. 20 1 1).

i . treating physi ci ans Al t hough t he ALJ general l y summari zed t he t reat ment records of t wo of Pl ai nt i f f s t reat i ng physi ci ans, Dr. Jor ge Vener eo, a neurol ogi st , and Dr. Emi l i ana Arocha, a psychi at ri st , he wei ghed onl y t he opi ni ons set fort h i n t he medi cal sour ce s t at ement each pr ovi ded. val ue, ' ' Tr. 27, and Dr. Ar ocha' s opi ni on was i s overl y di re and of l i t t le pr obat i ve val ue. ' ' Tr. 28. Addi t i onal l y, t he ALJ di d not assi gn any wei ght t o t he opi ni ons of Dr. Robert o

Tr. 26- 8, The ALJ found t hat Dr. Venereo' s opi ni on was t s of l i t t le pr obat i ve

Pol anco, Pl ai nt i f f s pai n management t r eat i ng physi ci an.

When t he ALJ makes t he RFC ass essment she must gi ve (û g sl ubs t ant i al wei ght . . . t o t he opi ni on, di agnosi sand medi cal evi dence of a t r eat i ng physi ci an unl ess t here i s

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good cause t o do ot her wi se. ' ' Ti l l man, 20 13 WL 40 14979, #3. C l Good cause exi s t s when t he: (1) t reat i ng physi ci an' s opi ni on was not bol st er ed by t he evi dence' , (2) evi dence support ed a cont rary f i ndi ng; or (3) t reat i ngphysi ci an's opi ni on was concl usor y or i nconsi s t ent wi t h t he doct or' s own medi cal recor ds. ' ' Phi l l i ps, 357 F. 3d at 1241 (ci t ati on omi t t ed). The ALJ mus t cl earl y art i cul at e her reasoni ng when gi vi ng a t r eat i ng physi ci an' s opi ni on l ess t han s ubs t ant i al wei ght . f#. C l g Wl here medi cal evi dence does not concl usi vel y count er t he t reat i ng physi ci an' s opi ni on, and no ot her good cause i s pr esent ed, t he Commi ssi oner cannot di s count t he t reat i ng doct or' s opi ni on. ' ' Dobson v. Col vi n, No. 6: 13- CV-01434, 20 14 WL 6432855, * 7 (N. D. Al a. Nov. 14, 2014).

a. Dr. Venereo, an i nt erni st , t r eat ed Pl ai nt i f f i n 20 12 and 20 13, and prepared t wo

Dr. Jorge Venereo and Dr. Emili ana Arocha

medi cal assessment s of Pl ai nt i f f s abi l i t y t o do wor k- r el at ed act i vi t y, dat ed May 2, 2012,



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4 I bot h assessment s, Dr. Vener eo found t hat and October 23 , 2013. Tr. 512-18, 634- 9. n Pl ai nti ff had si gni fi cant ly mor e sever e physi cal i mpai rment s t han ar e r et lect ed i n t he RFC. Tr. 512- 28, 634-9. Dr. Ar ocha, a psychi at ri st, t reat ed Pl ai nt i ff f rom 2010 t hr ough t he dat e of heari ng i n l at e 2013. Tr. 382- 96, 509-1 1, 532- 40, 566- 83. On Sept ember 24, 2013, about a mont h bef ore t he hear i ng, Dr. Ar ocha pr epar ed a medi cal ass essment of Pl ai nt i ff s abi l i ty to do wor k- rel at ed acti vi ti es, fi ndi ng t hat Pl ai nt i ff had poor abi l i ty t o make any occupat i onal adjus t ment s, and poor t o no abi l i ty t o make per for mance or per sonal or soci al adjus t ment s i n t he work pl ace. Tr. 582- 3.

4 The support i ng treatment records are at Tr. 640-82.

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Regardi ng t hese provi ders, Pl ai nt i ff cl ai ms t he ALJ fai l ed t o: (1) wei gh t he ent i r ety of t he opi ni ons of Drs. Vener eo and Arocha (DE 20, p. 8- 91, (2) pr operl y art i cul at e a wei ght f or t he opi ni ons (1d. at 9- 11q , and (3) accor d cont r ol l i ng wei ght t o t he t reat i ng physi ci an' s opi ni ons. L ld at pp. 11 - 41.

Fi rst , as f or Dr s. Venereo and Arocha, t he ALJ wei ghed onl y t hei r medi cal source st at ement s, not t hei r t reat ment not es. Tr. 26- 8. Thi s was er ror. û ç Medi cal opi ni ons' ' i ncl ude a medi cal provi der' s t reat ment not es. Wi nschel , 631 F. 3d at 1179. On remand, t he ALJ shoul d consi der t he doct or' s t reat ment not es as wel l as t he medi cal source s t at ement s and wei gh a11 of t he opi ni ons.

Second, al t hough t he ALJ cri t i qued t he opi ni ons of Drs. Vener eo and Ar ocha, he di d not unambi guousl y s t at e t he wei ght he gave t hose opi ni ons. Rat her he wrot e t hat Dr. Venereo's opi ni on was û l overl y di r e, ' ' and bot h opi ni ons had i t l i t t l e probat i ve val ue. ' ' Tr. 27-8. Had t he ALJ sai d t hat he gave t hose opi ni ons a part i cul ar wei ght , s uch as k l some wei ght ' ' , i t l i t t l e wei ght ' ' or

not ent i t l ed t o cont rol l i ng wei ght, Dr. Arocha' s opi ni on was

û û no wei ght ' ' t hi s woul d have been cl ear. I ns t ead, t he Court must guess whet her û û l i t t l e pr obat i ve val ue' ' , f or exampl e, means he di sr egar ded t hat opi ni on i n i t s ent i ret y, or per haps gave i t l i t t l e wei ght. Because t he ALJ' S deci si on does not pr ovi de t he Cour t wi t h suf f i ci ent i nformat i on t o eval uat e whet her t he ALJ appl i ed t he cor rect l egal anal ysi s i n wei ghi ng each opi ni on, and whet her s ubst anti al evi dence, t he Court mus t remand. See Perez, 2008 WL 191036, # 5.

Thi r d, Pl ai nt i ff argues t hat t he ALJ er r ed i n not gi vi ng t he opi ni ons of t hese



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the ALJ's determinations are supported by

treating physicians controlling weight. Because the ALJ

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did not articulate the specific

weight he gave each opinion, I cannot assess whether the ALJ properly weighed these opinions.

For these reasons, I recommend that on remand the ALJ articulate as specific

5 if the ALJ chooses to give weight for the opinions of each of the treating physicians and

, any of the opinions less than controlling weight, he clearly articulate his basis for doing so.

b. Dr. Roberto Polanco Plaintiff alleges the ALJ's failure to weigh the opinions of Dr. Roberto Polanco, one of Plaintiff's treating physicians. (DE 20, pp. 6-71. An ALJ's failure to state with particularity the weight given to each medical opinion is reversible error. *Caldwel v. Barnhart*, 261 Fed. Appx. 188, 190 (11th Cir. 2008). The Commissioner argues that any error is harmless. *g DE 21*, pp.7-9j. However, failure to weigh medical opinions very rarely results in harmless error. *Ocasio v. Comm. of Social Security*, Case No: 6:14-cv-1635-Or 1 - GJK, 2016 WL 455459, *3 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 5, 2016).

Dr. Polanco treated Plaintiff for pain from October 2012 through August 2013. Tr. 606-633. Dr. Polanco's treatment notes indicate that Plaintiff was neurologically intact and could walk without assistance, and she had significant pain in her back and lower extremities.

1d. The ALJ mentions, without weighing, the reports of Dr. Polanco's opinion that support his RFC. (Tr. 21, 25, 27). However, his decision does not discuss Dr. Polanco's assessment of Plaintiff's pain. Tr. 21-2.

5 In weighing Dr. Venereo's opinions, the ALJ should specifically consider the fact that portions of Dr. Polanco's opinions are consistent with Dr. Venereo's evaluation of Plaintiff's physical limitations.

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This is not harmless error because some of those Dr. Polanco's opinions contradict the RFC. Dr. Polanco's opinions that Plaintiff suffers from significant pain are consistent with Dr. Venereo's opinion of the extent of Plaintiff's physical limitations, and these opinions are



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inconsistent with the physical limitations in the RFC. As already noted, where an ALJ does not specify the weight given to evidence contrary to his decision, this is reversible error. Hart, 2001 WL 4356149, #5 The Court must know what weight the ALJ gives to Dr. Polanco's opinions, so that it can determine whether substantial evidence supports the RFC. Another reason why this matter should be remanded to the Commission.

The Court cannot make that assessment here; and this is

II. State agency reviewers Two state agency reviewers, Nancy Hinkeldey, PI Z. D., and Wendy Silver, Psy. D., prepared mental residual functional capacity assessments of Plaintiff on December 19, 2011, and January 30, 2012, respectively. Tr. 70-1, 97-99. These reviewers found that Plaintiff had only mild non-exertional limitations. 1d. Neither consultant examined Plaintiff, rather these assessments were based on a review of the records provided by Plaintiff at the time. Tr. 63-5, 90-3. In weighing opinions by medical consultants, the ALJ is required to apply a stricter standard than that applied in weighing the opinions of treating physicians. SSR 96-6p. The more attenuated the interaction between the consultant and the claimant, the stricter standard the ALJ should apply. 1d. The opinion of a State agency consultant may be given more weight than that of a treating source if the consultant's opinion is based on a review of the complete case record that includes a medical report from a specialist in the individual's particular impairment which provides

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more detailed and comprehensive information than what was available to the individual's treating source.' ' f#.

The ALJ determined that the opinions of the State agency reviewers were it largely consistent with the objective evidence' ' ; however, he did not assign a specific weight to these opinions, Tr. 28. From the non-exertional limitations in the RFC it appears that the ALJ credited the reviewers' opinions more than those of that of Dr. Arocha. The ALJ does not identify any detailed and comprehensive information available to the reviewers that was not available to Dr. Arocha, that would justify giving the reviewers opinions greater weight, as required by SSR 96-6p.

This is not surprising given that both reviewers reviewed an incomplete psychiatric treatment history. In fact, the record contains numerous additional treatment notes by Dr. Arocha and a psychosocial evaluation of Plaintiff, a 1 of which took place after the reviewers had issued their opinions. Tr. 532-540, 553-581. Thus, the ALJ must also reweigh the State agency reviewer's opinions applying the standard set forth in SSR 96-6p, and articulate a specific weight for each opinion.



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B. The ALJ must reevaluate his credibility determination in considering the RFC, the ALJ must consider a claimant's subjective testimony of pain and other symptoms when there is evidence of an underlying medical condition and (1) the objective medical evidence to confirm the severity of the alleged pain arising from that condition, or (2) the likelihood of determining medical condition is of a severity that can reasonably be expected to give rise to the alleged pain. Foot v. Chatler, 67 F.3d 1553, 1560 (11th Cir. 1995). As set forth above, at the hearing Plaintiff testified

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regarding the severity of her pain and depression. When, as here, a claimant provides testimony as to her subjective claim of disabling pain or other symptoms, the WLJ must carefully articulate explicit and adequate reasons for discrediting the claimant's allegations.

Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

In considering Plaintiff's testimony regarding her subjective symptoms, the ALJ found that the claimant's statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms are not credible and articulated four reasons to support of this

6 conclusion. Tr. 26.

First, the ALJ discounted Plaintiff's claim that she is unable to focus or concentrate. Tr. 26. The ALJ noted that Plaintiff maintains a blog on Cuban politics, which she testified she spends a few minutes a day updating; however, she stated to Dr. Arocha that she updates the blog constantly. The ALJ found these statements to be entirely inconsistent. Plaintiff's claim that she is unable to focus or concentrate is not credible because she passed the U.S. citizenship test in English, and she

necessarily inconsistent, 26. These statements, however, are not

she updates her blog constantly, could be consistent with her testimony that she updates it daily and that she updates take a few minutes.

Second, the ALJ found that Plaintiff's claim that she does not speak English fluently was not credible because she passed the U.S. citizenship test in English, and she

6 Nonetheless, identifying alleged inconsistencies in Plaintiff's statements, the ALJ did not

, address the fact that her testimony at the hearing was through an interpreter. Nor did he acknowledge that, given Plaintiff's limited English skills, her statements to her medical



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providers were most likely made in Spanish and translated to English when the treatment notes were prepared.

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previously worked translating medical documents from English to Spanish. Tr. 26. However, the record shows that Plaintiff used a dictionary to do her job and she was fired because her English was not good enough. Tr. 46-7. Plaintiff also conceded at the hearing that she has a stronger command of written English than spoken English. Tr. 43. Moreover, in contradistinction to his discrediting of the Plaintiff, the ALJ ultimately found that Plaintiff is not able to communicate in English. ' ' (Tr. 291.

Third, the ALJ found Plaintiff's testimony that she did not attend to the routine activities of daily living to be ' ' completely contrary' ' to a representation she made to a psychiatrist in May 2013 that she can complete basic living skills on her own. Tr. 26, 558. Again, the statements are not totally inconsistent. At the hearing, Plaintiff testified that she can get herself showered, dressed, and shaven, which is consistent with the statement she made in May 2013. Tr. 44. She also stated at the hearing, however, that she did not have the desire to care for herself.

Moreover, in the same session where Plaintiff self-reported she could undertake basic living skills, the doctor noted that Plaintiff had ' ' C t poor coping skills. ' ' Tr. 559. Likewise, Dr. Arocha's treatment notes from April 2013 indicate that, at that time, Plaintiff was exhibiting signs of psychotic border-line psychotic process' ' and visual and auditory findings call into doubt Plaintiff's ability to accurately assess her coping skills in May

hallucinations that interfere with day to day functioning. ' ' Tr. 568- 9. These

2013.

Finally, the ALJ relies on an opinion by Dr. Peter Miller, a consulting orthopedist, who briefly examined Plaintiff, to find that Plaintiff is less than credible. Tr.

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26, 550-1. Dr. Miller opined that Plaintiff was ' ' over exaggerated' ' her physical symptoms based on the finding that Plaintiff ' ' û ç i s and let her go. ' ' Tr. 551. The ALJ accords Dr. Miller's opinion significant weight. Tr.

results of multiple Waddell tests. Tr. 551. Dr. Miller also allegedly depressed looking, and her movements are slow



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At the hearing, the ALJ interviewed Dr. Miller's determinations that Plaintiff was exaggerating her physical symptoms based on the Waddell test as an opinion that Plaintiff was lying. Tr. 49. Waddell signs are a group of physical signs that may indicate a psychological component to chronic low back pain, and that are positively correlated with high scores for depression. *Latimer v. N.Y. State Div. of Social Security Services*, 2015 WL 1111111, 2015 WL 1111111, 2015 WL 1111111. Given Plaintiff's acknowledged depressive disorder, positive Waddell signs may well be a reflection of her depression rather than deliberate untruthfulness,

Moreover, although the ALJ gives significant weight to Dr. Miller's determinations regarding Plaintiff's physical symptoms, he completely ignores Dr. Miller's corroborating opinion of Plaintiff's severe depression. *Gay v. Astrue*, No. 3:09-cv-679-LHG, 2010 WL 3220299, *7 n.8 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 13, 2010) (stating although an ALJ is not required to discuss every piece of evidence in a record, an ALJ cannot pick and choose which evidence supports a decision while disregarding evidence to the contrary).

On remand, the ALJ shall reconsider Plaintiff's credibility in light of the above

7 discussions, after properly weighing and considering all of the medical opinions. C. Summary On remand, the ALJ should weigh the opinions of Dr. Jorge Venero, Dr. Emilia Arocha and Dr. Robert Polanco, as well as the state agency reviewers, and state with particularity the weight to be given to each of their opinions and the reasons therefor, as addressed in this report and recommendation. The ALJ should then consider the full medical record, as properly weighed, as well as the other evidence in the record to evaluate Plaintiff's credibility and determine the RFC, and explicitly state the basis for that determination. Applying the revised RFC, the ALJ should proceed to step five of the required analysis, to make a final determination of Plaintiff's eligibility for disability benefits. IV.

Recommendations

Based on the foregoing, I respectfully recommend that; Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (DE 20), be GRANTED, and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (DE 21), be DENIED, and the matter remanded for proceedings consistent with this report and recommendation.

I do not recommend that this matter be remanded for further consideration as set forth because above, and remand may result in a revised RFC, I do not reach Plaintiff's claim that the RFC is not supported by substantial evidence. g DE 20, pp. 15- 81.



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V. Object i o n s

The part i e s may t 5l e any wr i t t e n object i o n s t o t h i s Report and Recommendat i o n wi t h t h e Honorabl e K. Mi chael Moor e no l at e r t h a n fourt e e n days f r o m t h e dat e of t h i s report and recommendat i o n. Fai l u r e t o t i m e l y f i l e object i o n s shal l bar t h e part i e s f r o m at t a c k i n g o n appeal any f a c t u a l f i n d i n g s cont a i n e d h e r e i n. RTC v. Hal l mark Bui l d e r s, Inc. , 996 F. 2d l 144, 1 l 49 (1 l t h Ci r. 1993); Locat e v. Dagger, 847 F. 2d 745, 749- 50

(1 l t h Ci r. 1988).

RESPECTFULLY SUBMI TTED i n chambers i n Mi ami , Fl ori da, t h i s 27t h day of

July, 2016.

< CHRI S MCALI LEY UNI TED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE Copi e s t o: The Honorabl e K. Mi chael Moor e Counsel of record