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### MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Plaintiff, James Van Gundy ("Van Gundy"), instituted the above-entitledaction against defendant P.T. Freeport Indonesia, a/k/a Copper OverseasService Co. ("Freeport"), alleging Freeport discharged him in violationof Montana's WrongfulDischarge From Employment Act, Mont. Code Ann. §§ 39-2-901, et seq.("WDEA"). Freeport invokes the diversity jurisdiction of this courtpursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Presently before the court is Freeport'smotion for summary judgment. Having reviewed the record herein, togetherwith the parties' briefs in support of their respective positions, thecourt is prepared to rule.

### BACKGROUND

Freeport is a mining company, incorporated in Delaware, with itsprincipal place of business in Indonesia. Freeport's operations inIndonesia include copper mines and other facilities for processing copperore. Freeport maintains offices in New Orleans. Louisiana. where itrecruits prospective employees. At times pertinent to this matter. VanGundy was a resident of Belt, Montana.

In 1994, Van Gundy submitted an application for employment withFreeport. In response to the application, Freeport invited Van Gundy to interview in New Orleans. The interview occurred in November of 1994.Following the interview, Freeport offered Van Gundy employment as an OreFlow Superintendent at Freeport's copper mine in Iran Jaya, Indonesia. The offer was communicated to Van Gundy, by phone, at his home in Belt inDecember of 1994.<sup>1</sup>

Upon receipt of the offer, Van Gundy completed a pre-employmentphysical examination and traveled to New Orleans to further discussFreeport's employment offer. While in New Orleans, Van Gundy received thefollowing letter from Freeport which fully described the terms of Freeport's offer. Included in the offer was a choice of law provisionwhich stated that all disputes arising out of the employment relationshipwould be governed by Louisiana law.

### Dear Mr. Van Gundy:

I am pleased to offer you employment initially as Ore FlowSuperintendent, on behalf of Freeport Overseas Service Company (the"Company") at a present base salary of \$5,833.33 per month, (annualizedsalary is \$70,000.00) plus a current overseas premium of \$2.041.66 permonth which is currently based on 35% of base pay (or \$24,500.00annualized premium). Both the base salary and

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overseas premium aresubject to applicable taxes. As discussed during our interview, you willbe working at the mine site of the copper operations (located in theprovince of Iran Jaya, Indonesia) of the Company's affiliate, P.T.Freeport Indonesia. Company ("PTFI") in accordance with arrangementsbetween the company and PTFI. You will, however, remain an employee of the company for all purposes, including salary and benefits.

The normal work week is 54 hours. However, it must be emphasized thenecessary overtime is frequent, and since this is a supervisoryposition, there is no overtime compensation. Also, you may be assignedshift work. Your point of origin, for purposes of company-provided traveland relocation allowances, will be established as Belt, Montana. As amember of the supervisory staff of the Company, you are provided with theopportunity to participate in benefits including life insurance, medicalinsurance, long term disability insurance, dental insurance, dependentlife insurance, pension plan, and company savings plan (ECAP).

Summaries of these and other company benefits can be found in the "Working With Freeport-McMoRan" booklet. Your rights to benefits aregoverned by the terms, conditions and provisions of the applicablebenefit plan documents, and in the event of any inconsistencybetween the summaries and the applicable benefit plan document, the plandocument will control. Additionally, the policy manual, benefit plandocument, and summary booklet are subject to change, with or withoutnotice, and are in no way intended to create a contractual relationshipbetween you and the company.

It is recognized and agreed that the exclusive remedy for any on-the-jobinjury will be governed by the Louisiana Worker's Compensation Act.Louisiana law will govern all issues that may arise out of the employmentrelationship.

This offer is contingent upon satisfactory completion of medicalexaminations for you and your family, as well as receiving theappropriate passports, visas and work permits. This offer is foremployment at will. You, therefore, have the right to resign at anytime, and the Company has the right to terminate your employment at anytime.

We look forward to your joining the Company and assisting with this exciting operation. Should you have any questions about this offer, please feet free to call me at 1-800-624-7624 here in New Orleans. Please indicate your acceptance of our offer by signing the enclosed copy of this letter and returning it to me.

Very truly yours.

### FREEPORT OVERSEAS SERVICE COMPANY

(/s/ G.M. Chatham)

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### G.M. Chatham Assistant Director International Human Resources

GMC/tzg

GENTLEMEN:

Accordingly, I hereby acknowledge by signing this 9th day of Jan., 1995, in New Orleans, Louisiana. I have received a copy of the FREEPORTOVERSEAS SERVICE COMPANY ORIENTATION AND COMPANY RELOCATION GUIDE, and also a copy of WORKING WITH FREEPORT-McMoRan INC.

(/s/ James F. Van Gundy)

Signature

(/s/ Tammy Golladay)

WITNESS

(/s/ Dianne P. Van Gundy)

WITNESS

Van Gundy indicated his acceptance of the employment offer by signing acopy of the referenced letter on January 9, 1995, while in New Orleans.<sup>2</sup>

In April of 1995, Van Gundy moved from Belt to Iran Jaya, Indonesia, and began work with Freeport as an Ore Flow Superintendent. Van Gundyremained in Indonesia until September 30, 1997, when he was discharged. The discharge was premised, in part, upon events occurring at a companysafety meeting on September 19, 1997. The safety meeting was attended by a number of Freeport managers, safety department employees, and employeeswho worked in the same department as Van Gundy. The attendees includedboth expatriates and Indonesians. During the meeting, Van Gundycriticized the safety department for failing to give his subordinatesproper credit for their safety efforts. Van Gundy's comments included ashort outburst in which he used expletives. An Indonesian employee at themeeting expressed displeasure at Van Gundy's use of expletives.

Following the meeting, Van Gundy was questioned about his comments bycertain Freeport managers. A written warning was issued reprimanding VanGundy for his use of inappropriate langnage at the company safetymeeting. When Van Gundy refused to sign the warning, he was discharged.<sup>3</sup>After his employment was terminated, Van Gundy returned to Montanawhere he instituted the present action. Van Gundy seeks compensatorydamages and attorney fees premised

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upon Freeport's alleged violations of Montana's WDEA. §§ 39-2-901, et seq.

Freeport contends the present action should be dismissed becauseLouisiana law, not Montana law, governs the claims for wrongfuldischarge, and the undisputed facts reveal that Van Gundy does not haveviable claim for wrongful discharge under applicable Louisiana law.

### DISCUSSION

The court must necessarily begin its analysis by addressing the choiceof law issue presented by the parties. A federal court sitting indiversity must apply the choice of law rules of the forum state todetermine which state's substantive law, applies. Alaska Airlines, Inc.v. United Airlines, Inc., 902 F.2d 1400, 1402 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing,Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496, 61 S.Ct. 1020,85 L.Ed. 1477 (1941)). Accordingly, the court must apply Montana's choiceof law rules to determine whether Louisiana law or Montana law governsVan Gundy's wrongful discharge claim.

1. Application of Montana's Choice of Law Rules

In Montana, if a contract contains a choice of law provision, the lawof the chosen state governs any dispute arising from the contract unlesseither of the following two exceptions from the Restatement (Second) ofConflicts of Laws § 187(2) are applicable. A court will not apply the state law chosen by the parties if:

a. the chosen state has no substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction and there is no other reasonable basis for the parties' choice; or

b. application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a fundamental policy of a state which has a materially greater interest than the chosen state in the determination of the particular issue and which, under section 188, would be the state of the applicable law in the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties.<sup>4</sup>

See, Casarotto v. Lombardi, 268 Mont. 369, 886 P.2d 931, 934-35 (1994),rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto,517 U.S. 681, 116 S.Ct. 1652, 134 L.Ed.2d 902 (1996), (quotingRestatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 187(2) (1971)). Because the parties' employment contract in this case contains a choice of lawprovision which states that Louisiana law will govern any disputearising from the parties' employment relationship, the court is compelled apply Louisiana law in this matter unless one of the referenced exceptions applies.

(1) Exception under § 187(2)(a)

Under this first exception, the court must determine whether the chosenstate has a substantial relationship to the parties or the issue underreview. In the present case, it cannot be reasonably

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disputed thatLouisiana has a significant relationship with both the parties and thematter at issue because Freeport maintains offices in Louisiana, and theparties' employment contract was negotiated and executed in Louisiana.Based on these facts, the court concludes the first exception does notapply.

(2) Exception under § 187(2)(b)

A proper analysis of the second exception requires a two-prongedinquiry. First, the court must determine whether Montana's interest in the present dispute is materially greater than Louisiana's interest, i.e., whether Montana law would govern this matter in the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties. In making this determination, the court is to consider the following five factors described in section 1880f the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law.

- 1. the place of contracting,
- 2. the place of negotiation of the contract,
- 3. the place of performance,
- 4. the location of the subject matter of thecontract, and
- 5. The domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties.

Keystone, Inc. v. Triad Systems Corp., 971 P.2d 1240, 1242 (Mont. 1998),quoting, Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 188(2) (1971).<sup>5</sup>If the court concludes that Montana has a materially greaterinterest in this matter, the court must then undertake to determinewhether application of Louisiana law would be contrary to fundamentalpolicy of the State of Montana.

In the present case, the employment contract was executed inLouisiana. Significant negotiations occurred in Louisiana during VanGundy's initial interview in November 1994, and later in January of 1995when Van Gundy accepted Freeport's offer of employment. Some negotiationsmay also have occurred during phone conversations and letters exchangedbetween Van Gundy, in Montana, and Freeport, in Louisiana. The employmentcontract was performed exclusively in Indonesia. The location of thesubject matter of the contract (i.e., the Ore Flow Superintendentposition) was, likewise, in Indonesia.<sup>6</sup> Freeport was a resident ofLouisiana and Indonesia. Van Gundy was a resident of Montana andIndonesia. Applying the section 188 criteria to the foregoing facts, thecourt concludes that Louisiana has the greater interest in the presentdispute, and, therefore, Montana law would not govern this matter in theabsence of an effective choice of law provision.<sup>7</sup>

Having concluded that neither exception applies, and that Louisiana lawgoverns the parties' dispute, the court must now determine whether VanGundy has a viable claim for wrongful discharge under

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Louisiana law. InLouisiana, an employer may discharge an at-willemployed at any time, for any reason or for no reason at all, provided the discharge does not violate a statutory or constitutional provision.Gilbert v. Tulane Univ., 909 F.2d 124, 126 (5th Cir. 1990); see also, Dunbar v. Williams, 554 So.2d 56 (La. App. 1988).<sup>8</sup>

Because Van Gundy's pleadings and brief focus solely on whether aviable claim for wrongful discharge exists under Montana law, the courtdeems it appropriate to afford Van Gundy an opportunity to submit asupplemental brief which focuses, on the viability of his wrongfuldischarge claim under Louisiana law. Van Gundy shall submit his brief onor before May 17, 1999. Freeport shall have up to and including May 31,1999, to submit an appropriate response brief. Upon submission of thesebriefs, the court will be in a position to make an informed decision onFreeport's motion for summary judgment.

#### IT IS SO ORDERED.

1. The record is unclear whether Freeport's offer of employment wasinitially communicated to Van Gundy, by phone, in December of 1994, orduring an interview in New Orleans in January of 1995. Because Van Gundybelieves he first learned of the offer by phone in December of 1994, thecourt will assume the same for purposes of this Memorandum andOrder.

2. Although Van Gundy contends his signature on the referenced letterdid not operate as an acceptance of Freeport's employment offer, but onlyan acknowledgment that he received the offer, together with a copy of Freeport's Orientation and Company Relocation Guide and a documententitled "Working with Freeport-McMoRan Inc.", the record does not support this contention.

There is no evidence in the record of subsequent contract negotiations between the parties, or subsequent changes to the contract terms. Moreover, Van Gundy fails to present any evidence that his employment with Freeport was governed by a different contract executed after January9, 1995.

3. The parties do not agree on the precise reason for Van Gundy's discharge. Freeport contends the discharge was based solely on VanGundy's failure to sign the written warning. Van Gundy contends his discharge was also based upon the comments he made at the safetymeeting.

4. Section 188 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

(1) The rights and duties of the parties with respect to an issue in contract are determined by the local law of the state which. with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the transaction and the parties . . .

(2) In the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties . . . the context to be taken into account . . . to determine the law applicable to an issue include:

(a) the place of contracting,

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(b) the place of negotiation of the contract,

(c) the place of performance,

(d) the location of the subject matter of the contract, and

(e) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties.

See, Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 188.

5. The five factors are to be evaluated according to their relativeimportance with respect to the particular matter under scrutiny. See,Casarotto, 886 P.2d at 934.

6. Van Gundy makes the novel argument, without citation to anyauthority, that, he, as, the employee, was the subject matter of theemployment contract at issue. Even if this were true, the location of thesubject matter of the contract would remain as Indonesia because VanGundy resided in Indonesia at all times during his employment withFreeport.

7. Because the court concludes that Montana law would not apply in theabsence of an effective choice of law by the parties, the court does notfind it necessary to determine whether Louisiana law would be contrary to a fundamental policy of the state of Montana.

8. For example, "[a]n employee cannot be terminated because of race,sex, or religious beliefs or because he/she exercised constitutionallyprotected rights such as free speech." Wusthoff v. Bally's Casino LakeshoreResort, Inc., 709 So.2d 913, 914 (La.App. 1998).

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