

2021 | Cited 0 times | D. Nebraska | November 17, 2021

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA CAMERON L.,

Plaintiff, vs. KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration,

Defendant.

8:20CV440

MEMORANDUM

AND ORDER

This is an action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for judicial review of the Social under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1381-1383f, for supplemental security income (SSI) benefits. 1

See 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3) The final determination of the Commissioner of Social Security after a hearing under paragraph (1) shall be subject to judicial review as provided in section 405(g) of this title to the same extent as the Commissioner's final determinations under section 405 of this title. For the affirmed.

I. BACKGROUND A. Procedural History Plaintiff applied for SSI benefits on January 3, 2012, when he was 55 years old. Plaintiff claimed he was disabled due to blindness, mental illness, a brain tumor, . The alleged disability onset date was March 1, 2000. (Filing 19-5, Tr. 178-184; Filing 19-6, Tr. 197).

1 In accordance with General Order No. 2015-15, the matter is submitted to the court on cross-motions (Filings 33, 37), based on review of the pleadings and briefs and the administrative record (Filing 19).

8:20-cv-00440-RGK Doc # 39 Filed: 11/17/21 Page 1 of 22 - Page ID # 712

The claim was denied initially on June 21, 2018. (Filing 19-3, Tr. 106-122). Plaintiff requested a hearing on June 27, 2018, and 16 months later, on October 23, 2019 (Filing 19-4, Tr. 129-130; Filing 19-2, Tr. 54-55, 60-100). An impartial vocational expert (VE) also testified at the hearing (Filing 19-2,

2021 | Cited 0 times | D. Nebraska | November 17, 2021

Tr. 54-55, 100-104). Although informed of the right to representation, Plaintiff chose to appear and testify without the assistance of an attorney or other representative. (Filing 19-2, Tr. 56-59). The ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on November 13, 2019. (Filing 19-2, Tr. 24). The Appeals Council denied request for review on September 9, 2020. (Filing 19-2, Tr. 1-5). This action was timely commenced on October 21, 2020 (Filing 1). Plaintiff appears pro se, and has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (See Filing 5). 2 B. Using the sequential analysis prescribed by Social Security regulations, 3

the ALJ made the following findings:

2 f counsel were denied by the court on March 3, March 22, August 9, 2021. (Filings 21, 27, 34).

3 See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a). At step one, the claimant has the burden to establish that he or she has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since his or her alleged disability onset date. At step two, the claimant has the burden to prove he or she has a medically determinable physical or mental impairment or combination of impairments that significantly limits his or her physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities. At step three, if the claimant shows that his or her impairment meets or equals a presumptively disabling impairment listed in the regulations, he or she is automatically found disabled and is entitled to benefits. If not, the ALJ determines the claimant which the ALJ uses at steps four and five. At step four, the claimant has the burden to prove he or she lacks the RFC to perform his or her past relevant work. If the claimant can still do his or her past relevant work, he or she will be found not disabled; otherwise, at step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove, considering the claimant's RFC, age, education, and work experience, that there are other jobs in the national economy the claimant can perform.

8:20-cv-00440-RGK Doc # 39 Filed: 11/17/21 Page 2 of 22 - Page ID # 713

1. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since January 3, 2018, the application date (20 CFR 416.971 et seq.). 2. The claimant has the following severe impairments: seizure disorder secondary to benign neoplasm of brain, status post resection (2009); and mood disorder, variously diagnosed as bipolar disorder and depression (20 CFR 416.920(c)). 3. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926). 4. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform medium work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(c) except that he cannot climb ladders or operate motor vehicles. He can have no exposure to unprotected heights. From a mental standpoint, he is able to understand, remember, carry out, and persist at tasks that are simple, straightforward, and uncomplicated. He is able to exercise proper judgment in performing those tasks and to respond appropriately to routine changes in the workplace and to routine supervision. He is able to respond and behave appropriately with others when performing tasks so long as they do not require more than incidental and superficial social interaction. 5. The

2021 | Cited 0 times | D. Nebraska | November 17, 2021

claimant has no past relevant work (20 CFR 416.965). individual of advanced age, on the date the application was filed (20 CFR 416.963). 7. The claimant has at least a high school education and is able to communicate in English (20 CFR 416.964). 8. Transferability of job skills is not an issue because the claimant does not have past relevant work (20 CFR 416.968). and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant 8:20-cv-00440-RGK Doc # 39 Filed: 11/17/21 Page 3 of 22 - Page ID # 714

numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform (20 CFR 416.969 and 416.969(a)). 10. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, since January 3, 2018, the date the application was filed (20 CFR 416.920(g)). (Filing 19-2, Tr. 29-40 (discussion of findings omitted)).

II. EVIDENTIARY MATERIALS On May 7, 2014, Roger Izzi, M.D., performed a consultative psychological license with an expiration date of 2018. Plaintiff stated that he lived alone, relied on

food stamps to buy food, and did not belong to clubs, groups, or organizations, and did not attend church or see family or friends. He reported occasional crying spells and endorsed auditory hallucinations. He claimed to have only a fifth-grade education. A mental status examination revealed that Plaintiff was alert, and casually dressed and groomed. He used a white cane to enter and leave the exam room and and his affect appeared dysphoric. His speech was normal and Dr. Izzi noted no signs

of hallu diagnostic impressions were unspecified bipolar disorder and antisocial personality

perform simple and repetitive or complex tasks on a consistent basis over an 8-hour

period; he would have a moderate limitation in his ability to get along with peers or to submit to supervision in a work-like setting, and he did not appear capable of responding to usual work session situations regarding attendance and safety or of dealing with changes in a routine work setting (Filing 19-7, Tr. 410-413). On June 27, 2014, Jonathan Macy, M.D., performed a consultative ophthalmological examination of Plaintiff. Plaintiff reported a history of brain surgery for meningioma 5 years prior with poor visual acuity since that time. Dr. and that refraction was of no help. The remainder of Plai within normal limits. Dr. Macy diagnosed Plaintiff with cortical blindness based on

his history (Filing 19-7, Tr. 404).

8:20-cv-00440-RGK Doc # 39 Filed: 11/17/21 Page 4 of 22 - Page ID # 715

On September 15, 2017, Plaintiff saw Tirath Gill, M.D., at the California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility (noted that Plaintiff was wearing a vision vest. A mental status examination was normal

2021 | Cited 0 times | D. Nebraska | November 17, 2021

(Filing 19-7, Tr. 322). On September 22, 2017, Plaintiff saw Robert Scharffenberg, M.D., at SATF, and asked to see the neurologist he saw for his April 2017 head injury. Plaintiff stated that he was feeling well. Plaintiff was alert, interactive, and in no acute distress. He was able to name the President and city, but not the date. He was able to perform serial subtractions, though he did so slowly (Filing 19-7, Tr. 318). On September 25, 2017, Plaintiff saw Barbara Fannin, Ph.D., at SATF. The examination revealed that Plaintiff was acceptable and his behavior cooperative. He

was alert and oriented, and while his mood was labile, his affect was unremarkable. endorsed auditory and visual hallucinations; however, his speech, thought process,

thought content, and insight were normal. He denied any homicidal or suicidal ideation (Filing 19-7, Tr. 323). On October 3, 2017, Plaintiff saw Dr. Scharffenberg at SATF, asking about a follow up appointment regarding surgical repair of his left nasal passage and raising dark glasses to prison with him and asked that it be documented in his medical

record though he was not wearing any glasses at the time of the visit. He was wearing a vision impaired vest. Dr. Scharffenberg noted that, while an April 2017 hemorrhage, it showed no signs of meningioma. Plaintiff stated that he felt well. He

also said that his last seizure occurred more than 6 months prior. Dr. Scharffenberg noted that Plaintiff was alert, interactive, and in no acute distress (Filing 19-7, Tr. 316-317). On October 23, 2017, Plaintiff saw Sunil Jacques, M.D., at SATF for a telepsychiatry visit. Plaintiff reported that his medications were working well, and he denied depressive, manic, anxiety, or psychotic symptoms. He denied any medication side effects. A mental status exam revealed that Plaintiff was alert and

8:20-cv-00440-RGK Doc # 39 Filed: 11/17/21 Page 5 of 22 - Page ID # 716

oriented and appropriately groomed. He behaved cooperatively, and his mood, affect, attention, concentration, speech, and thought process were normal. He denied hallucinations and suicidal and homicidal ideation (Filing 19-7, Tr. 321). On November 16, 2017, Plaintiff saw Chinyere Nyenke, M.D., at SATF, who noted that Plaintiff had a history of photophobia following excision of a brain tumor that dark glasses

improved his symptoms, and that he only wore them in bright light. Plaintiff described his bipolar disorder as well-controlled and denied and depressive symptoms. Dr. Nyenke noted that Plaintiff was alert and oriented, pleasant, calm, and cooperative, and his affect was normal. Dr. Nyenke advised Plaintiff not to wear his glasses inside his cell and referred him to an ophthamologist for further evaluation (Filing 19-7, Tr. 315-316). A November 30, 2107, treatment note by Michell Pacheco, RN, at SATF did not mention medication side effects (Filing 19-7, Tr. 314). On December 8, 2017, Plaintiff saw Anthony Hales, NP, at SATF, who noted that Plaintiff was alert and oriented, was pleasant, calm, and cooperative, and exhibited a normal affect (Filing19-7, Tr. 314-315). Department evaluated

2021 | Cited 0 times | D. Nebraska | November 17, 2021

Plaintiff for housing following his release from prison. At

intake, he stated that he was legally blind (seeing only blacks and gray shadows) and experienced seizures due to a prior brain tumor. He said that his last seizure occurred in April 2017. Margarita Lambiaso, RN, conducted a mental status exam, which was unremarkable. Another registered nurse, Victor Banuelos, noted that though Plaintiff al status as normal. (Filing

19-7, Tr. 335-340). On December 17, 2107, Behnam Ghahramani, a social worker, noted that Plaintiff refused his breakfast and said he was on a hunger strike at the Los Angeles County jail, advocating for his return to housing for inmates with legal impairments. Mr. Ghahramani noted that Plaintiff was adequately groomed and cooperative, and

8:20-cv-00440-RGK Doc # 39 Filed: 11/17/21 Page 6 of 22 - Page ID # 717

his mood, affect, speech, insight, judgment, and impulse control were unremarkable (Filing 19-7, Tr. 341-342). On December 19, 2017, Plaintiff saw Don Balbas, a mental health counselor at the jail. His mental status examination was normal (Filing 19-7, Tr. 341). On December 20, 2017, Plaintiff saw Mr. Ghahramani again. His mental status examination was normal (Filing 19-7, Tr. 342). On February 9, 2018, Plaintiff submitted a Function Report Adult to the Social Security Administration. Plaintiff stated that, on a typical day, he went for walks, played with his dog, and listened to music. He admitted that he was able to care for his dog, manage his personal care independently, prepare simple meals using a microwave, and perform household chores like making the bed and washing dishes. Plaintiff stated that he went outside daily, and that he got around by walking or riding a bus. He stated that he did not drive because he was unable to see. He shopped in stores for food, clothing, music, and other daily necessities. Plaintiff nt time with others and went to church, the library,

getting along with others (Filing 19-6, Tr. 219-224).

Regarding his functional abilities, Plaintiff alleged problems with seeing, memory, concentration, understanding, following instructions, completing tasks, and getting along with others, including authority figures. He said that he lost jobs because of his problems getting along with people. Plaintiff stated that he used a 2009. In one section of his report, Plaintiff alleged that his medication made him feel

the only side effect me (Filing 19-6, Tr. 224-226). On March 14, 2018, Walter C. Roberts, M.D., performed a consultative ophthalmological examination. Plaintiff reported a history of brain surgery for meningioma 9 years prior with poor visual acuity since that time. Dr. Roberts noted 8:20-cv-00440-RGK Doc # 39 Filed: 11/17/21 Page 7 of 22 - Page ID # 718 normal limits, but Dr. Roberts diagnosed Plaintiff with cortical blindness based on his history (Filing 19-7, Tr. 354). On March 24, 2018, state agency medical consultant Judy Martin, M.D., reviewed the medical evidence of record and found that Plaintiff had moderate limitations in his abilities to interact with others;

2021 | Cited 0 times | D. Nebraska | November 17, 2021

concentrate, persist, and maintain pace; and adapt and manage himself, and a mild limitation in his ability to functional abilities and assessed him as capable of carrying out simple, repetitive

instructions over the course of a normal workweek without extra supervision. She also concluded that Plaintiff was capable of functioning adequately in a setting that did not require extensive interactions with the public and that he was able to adapt to a routine workplace setting (Filing 19-3, Tr. 115, 119-120). On May 22, 2018, the Cooperative Disability Investigations (CDI) Unit 4 issued a summary report of its fraud investigation, which revealed that Plaintiff was functioning at a higher level than alleged in his application and supporting materials (Filing 19-7, Tr. 388-392). The CDI investigator obtained records from the California Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV), which showed that Plaintiff had a valid California driver license with an issue date of February 10, 2014. DMV records also indicated that Plaintiff had a motorcycle registered in his name, valid through May 28, 2017 (Filing 19-7, Tr. 390). During a telephone call with the investigator, Plaintiff revealed that he had his own government-issued cell phone (Filing 19-7, Tr. 390). The investigator -7, Tr. 390).

4 The Cooperative Disability Investigations (CDI) program is a joint effort of the Social Security Administration (SSA) and the Office of the Inspector General (OIG), in partnership with State Disability Determination Services (DDS) agencies and State and local law enforcement agencies. The Units investigate disability claims are suspicious. See https://oig.ssa.gov/cooperative-disability-investigations-cdi/.

8:20-cv-00440-RGK Doc # 39 Filed: 11/17/21 Page 8 of 22 - Page ID # 719

The investigator also visited a homeless shelter in Los Angeles, and an employee (Witness 1) identified Plaintiff as one of the facilities prior residents. Witness 1 stated that Plaintiff claimed he was blind and used a walking stick at times; however, assistive device. Witness 1 stated that he did not think Plaintiff was really blind

because he navigated throughout the interior of the large homeless shelter without the stick and walked outside without any assistive device and without difficulty. His hygiene and grooming were good (Filing 19-7, Tr. 391). Another employee of the shelter, Witness 2, also stated that he observed e device. In particular, Plaintiff was able to walk through the inside of the property, up and down steps within the facility, and outside the property. Witness 2 stated that Plaintiff did not appear disoriented while walking and Witness 2 did not believe Plaintiff was blind (Filing 19-7, Tr. 391). A third shelter employee, Witness 3 stated that Plaintiff was not blind and he walked without a stick or any other assistive device. Plaintiff often recognized Witness 3 from far away and would call his name and say hello. Witness 3 reported that Plaintiff had no trouble reading or signing documents given to him during his intake process, and he never asked for assistance or said that he was unable to see the documents. While a resident at the facility, Plaintiff had to meet with his caseworker to review and sign a weekly progress report; Plaintiff was able to read and sign the reports on his own. Witness 3 observed Plaintiff using a cell phone. Plaintiff sometimes left the facility carrying a

2021 | Cited 0 times | D. Nebraska | November 17, 2021

suitcase; other times, Plaintiff arrived at the facility carrying grocery bags in his hands. Witness 3 saw Plaintiff wearing sunglasses outside, but never saw him wearing reading glasses (Filing 19-7, Tr. 391- 392). On June 13, 2018, state agency medical consultant Michael Barricks, M.D., reviewed the evidence of record, including the CDI report, and concluded that Plaintiff did not have a medically determinable visual impairment (Filing 19-3, Tr. 114). On June 20, 2018, state agency medical consultant B. Vaghaiwalla, M.D., reviewed the medical evidence of record and determined that Plaintiff was capable

8:20-cv-00440-RGK Doc # 39 Filed: 11/17/21 Page 9 of 22 - Page ID # 720

of performing work at the medium exertional level, except that he could never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, and he must avoid all exposure to hazards due to his history of seizures (Filing 19-3, Tr. 117-118). On June 11, 2019, Ran Sankaranem, M.D., wrote a letter stating that Plaintiff was an inpatient at CHI Health, Immanuel Medical Center in Omaha, Nebraska, from June 10 to June 12, 2019 due to continuous episodes of seizures due to noncompliance with medication. Hospital records for the visit stated Plaintiff had traumatic injury with biting and marks on his tongue with swelling and intermittent confusional episodes concerning for a postictal state. Dr. Sankaranem started Plaintiff on Keppra and Plaintiff had no further seizure events. Dr. Sankaranem told Plaintiff to continue taking Keppra and to follow up with a neurologist. (Filing 19-7, Tr. 365, 367-368). On July 26, 2019, the Office of Hearing Operations sent Plaintiff a Notice of Hearing. The letter informed Plaintiff of his right to representation and included a pamphlet titled Your Right to Representation (Filing 19-4, Tr. 147-152, 154-155). On August 29, 2019, the Office of Hearing Operations sent Plaintiff a letter informing him of his right to representation at the administrative hearing. The letter included another copy of the pamphlet titled Your Right to Representation and a list of resources (Filing 19-6, Tr. 248-253). On September 26, 2019, Plaintiff saw Sonia Acharya-Gupta, M.D., at Charles Drew Health Center in Omaha, Nebraska. Though Dr. Acharya-Gupta listed diagnoses of seizure disorder, diabetes screening, paranoid schizophrenia, muscle spasm, legal blindness, depression, and anxiety, the treatment notes included no relevant findings (Filing 19-7, Tr. 385). On October 8, 2019, Plaintiff returned to the Charles Drew Health Center. His treatment goals included learning to handle frustration and tension; controlling his actions and thoughts; and gaining employment through community involvement. The treatment notes included no mental status examination findings (Filing 19-7, Tr. 430).

8:20-cv-00440-RGK Doc # 39 Filed: 11/17/21 Page 10 of 22 - Page ID # 721

and mental impairments (Filing 19-6, Tr. 274).

At the October 23, 2019 administrative hearing, which was conducted in Omaha, wanted to delay the hearing so that he could obtain a qualified representative.

Plaintiff conferred with his mother and decided to waive his right to representation and move

2021 | Cited 0 times | D. Nebraska | November 17, 2021

forward with the hearing (Filing 19-2, Tr. 56-59). Plaintiff testified that his mental conditions, seizures, and vision kept him from working. He stated that he experienced hallucinations and aggressive thoughts, and sometimes acted aggressively towards others. Plaintiff testified that he received mental and physical care at Charles Drew Health Center. He said he attended weekly behavioral therapy sessions beginning the previous summer. Plaintiff also said that testified to migraine headaches that occurred Tylenol. He testified that he experienced chest pain due to having been shot and

stabbed, and that Nitroglycerin did not relieve his pain. Plaintiff stated that his seizures, headaches, and chest pain had worsened over the last two years. Plaintiff said that he only saw shadows and had to use a magnifying glass to see things better. glasses. Plaintiff said that he never used a computer because he could not see the

screen. He indicated that he could not retrieve a jug of milk from the refrigerator and pour himself a glassful. When he was in an unfamiliar place, he asked for directions and then held a wall to guide himself. Plaintiff said that he had a service dog provided to him by the Braille Institute in Los Angeles. He also pointed out that he brought a cane to the hearing, and except for when he was in prison and had an escort, he used it all the time. Plaintiff said that his vision had worsened since 2009. (Filing 19-2, Tr. 61-70, 77, 80-87, 91-92, 95-97). Except for his brief hospitalization at Immanuel for a seizure in June 2019 and his treatment at the Charles Drew Health Center in 2019, Plaintiff admitted that he did not receive any medical treatment for his impairments during the relevant period.

8:20-cv-00440-RGK Doc # 39 Filed: 11/17/21 Page 11 of 22 - Page ID # 722

Plaintiff stated that he did not have insurance and/or Medicaid in Nebraska. (Filing 19-2, Tr. 71-72). on his mother. He stated that he spent his time attending therapy at the

Charles Drew Health Center and visiting the Salvation Army for rehabilitation treatment and behavior therapy. He also visited Community Alliance. (Filing 19-2, Tr. 72-74). Plaintiff maintained that he was unable to drive, and that he had not done so since 2009 (Filing 19-2, Tr. 78). At the administrative hearing, Karen Terrill, a VE, also testified (Filing 19-2, Tr. 54-55, 100-102). The VE testified that her testimony was consistent with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) (Filing 19-2, Tr. 100-101). The ALJ asked the VE whether any jobs existed in the national economy for an individual who could perform medium work with no climbing of ladders, exposure to unprotected heights or operation of motor vehicles; understand, remember, carry out and persist at simple, straightforward, and uncomplicated tasks; exercise proper judgment; respond appropriately to routine supervision and changes in the workplace; and respond and behave appropriately with others when performing tasks requiring no more than incidental and superficial social interaction (Filing 19-2, Tr. 101). The VE responded that that an individual with that RFC could perform the jobs of kitchen helper (DOT 318.687-010), with 130,000 jobs nationwide; counter supply worker. (DOT

2021 | Cited 0 times | D. Nebraska | November 17, 2021

319.687-010), with 95,000 jobs nationwide; and lab equipment cleaner (DOT 318.687-022), with 29,000 jobs nationwide (Filing 19-2, Tr. 102).

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW supported by substantial evidence or result from an error of law. Nash v. Comm'r,

Soc. Sec. Admin. findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by

8:20-cv-00440-RGK Doc # 39 Filed: 11/17/21 Page 12 of 22 - Page ID # 723

rd, a court looks to an existing administrative record and asks whether it contains sufficient evidence to Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, Id. (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938) It means and means only "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to Id. (quoting Consolidated Edison, 305 U.S. at 229).

In determining whether evidence is substantial, the court considers evidence because substantial evidence also supports the contrary outcome and even if the

court would have reached a different conclusion. Nash, 907 F.3d at 1089. The Eighth conclusions of the Social Security A Wright v. Colvin, 789 F.3d 847,

852 (8th Cir. 2015).

Delrosa v. Sullivan, 922

F.2d 480, 483 (1991) (citations omitted). The court, however, may remand to the [Commissioner] for consideration of new evidence where such evidence is material and the claimant demonstrates good cause for failing to submit the new evidence at the administrative level. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). To be considered material, the new -cumulative, relevant, and probative of the claimant's See Woolf v. Shalala, 3 F.3d 1210, 1215 (8th Cir.1993). Furthermore, it must be reasonably likely that the Commissioner s consideration of this new evidence would have resulted in an award of benefits. See id.; Jones v. Callahan, 122 F.3d 1148, 1154 (8th Cir. 1997). 5

5 Plaintiff has attached numerous exhibits to his brief (Filing 33 at 23-105) s decision is supported by substantial evidence. Nor has Plaintiff made the requisite showing for a remand based on newly discovered evidence. See, e.g., Allen v. Astrue, brief would not be considered by the district court, and case would not be remanded

8:20-cv-00440-RGK Doc # 39 Filed: 11/17/21 Page 13 of 22 - Page ID # 724

The Cou on legal error. Collins v. Astrue, 648 F.3d 869, 871 (8th Cir. 2011). Legal error may

2021 | Cited 0 times | D. Nebraska | November 17, 2021

be an error of procedure, the use of erroneous legal standards, or an incorrect application of the law Id. (citing Brueggemann v. Barnhart, 348 F.3d 689, 692 (8th Cir. 2003); Nettles v. Schweiker, 714 F.2d 833, 836 (8th Cir. 1983)). No deference is owed to the Commissioner's legal conclusions. Brueggemann, 348 F.3d at 692 (stating allegations of legal error are reviewed de novo).

IV. ISSUES PRESENTED Liberally construing combined motion and brief, the issues in this case are (1) whether (2) whether (3) whether substantial evidence -five finding that Plaintiff was not disabled; (4) whether the ALJ fully developed the record; and (5) whether Plaintiff received a fair hearing. (See Filing 33 at 2-22). As will be discussed below, the answer to each of these

V. DISCUSSION

A.

Plaintiff first contends the ALJ failed to properly evaluate his symptoms. See Filing 33) at 2, 7, 9, 11. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges the ALJ did not consider the effects of the medications he took. This allegation lacks merit.

In Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir. 1984), the Eighth Circuit held, ctive complaints and related functional limitations, prior work record; and observations by third parties (including treating and

examining physicians) regarding such matter (2) the duration, frequency, and intensity of pain or other symptoms; (3) any

for consideration of such evidence at the administrative level because plaintiff did not demonstrate good cause for failing to submit the new evidence).

8:20-cv-00440-RGK Doc # 39 Filed: 11/17/21 Page 14 of 22 - Page ID # 725

precipitating and aggravating factor; (4) the dosage, effectiveness, and side effects estrictions. Polaski, 739 F.2d at See Estes v.

Barnhart, 275 F.3d 722, 724 (8th Cir. 2002). If the ALJ explicitly discredits a Polaski or discuss

every factor in depth. See Schultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979, 983 (8th Cir. 2007); Strongson v. Barnhart, 361 F.3d 1066, 1072 (8th Cir. 2004).

Here, the ALJ applied the proper legal standard (Filing 19-2, Tr. 34), made express findings (Filing 192, Tr. 35), and provided valid reasons for his assessment lack of limitations, his failure to seek medical treatment during the relevant period,

2021 | Cited 0 times | D. Nebraska | November 17, 2021

medical and psychological consultants to the effect that Plaintiff retained the RFC

to unskilled work at the medium exertional level (Filing 19-2, Tr. 32-33, 35-39).

did not address the side effects of his medications. See Filing 33) at 2, 7,

Schwandt v. Berryhill, 926 F.3d 1004, 1012 (8th Cir. 2019). Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit has recognized there are instances when an ALJ statements about the side effects of his medications. See Buckner v. Astrue, 646 F.3d

of the other factors, including any side effect Hajek v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 89, 92 (8th Cir. 1994) (dismissing claim that the ALJ

committed error by failing to discuss statements regarding the side effects of ed these side effects see also Sanders v. Astrue, No. 4:08CV3125, 2009 WL 226031, evaluate the side effects of her medications where claimant presented no evidence

8:20-cv-00440-RGK Doc # 39 Filed: 11/17/21 Page 15 of 22 - Page ID # 726

to show that she discussed side effects with her doctors and never previously alleged that medication side effects contributed to her alleged disability).

Although Plaintiff alleged in one disability report that his medications made him feel tired and dizzy (Filing 19-6, Tr. 224), those allegations did not appear in other reports, and Plaintiff even denied that he was taking medication at times (Filing 19-6, Tr. 213, 239, 259-260, 274, 289-290, 298, 302; Filing 19-7, Tr. 390). Plaintiff also never reported side effects to his treatment providers (Filing 19-7, Tr. 308-310, 314-318, 323, 329-342, 385, 430). In October 2017, just a few months before he filed for SSI benefits, Plaintiff denied experiencing any medication side effects (Filing 19-7, Tr. 321).

Plaintiff next argues the ALJ erred in assessing his RFC. See Filing 33) at 1-10, 12, 14-17, 21. This allegation also is without merit.

mental work activities on a sustained basis despite limitation from his impairments

(Filing 19-2, Tr. 29). See 20 C.F.R. § 416.945. Although the RFC determination is a medical question that requires some medical evidence, it is an administrative determination reserved to the Commissioner. See Cox v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 614, 619- 20 (8th Cir. 2007); Guilliams v. Barnhart, 393 F.3d 798, 803 (8th Cir. 2005); 20 C.F.R. 416.927(d), 416.946 the relevant evidence, including medical records, observations of treating physicians

See Sultan v. Barnhart, 368 F.3d at 864 (8th Cir. 2004); Pearsall v. Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, resolve

2021 | Cited 0 times | D. Nebraska | November 17, 2021

questions of credibility and questions arising from conflicting medical

evidence. See Estes, 275 F.3d at 725.

Here, t finding by considering the record as a whole, including the objective findings in the

treatment record, the opinions of state agency medical consultants, the opinions of

8:20-cv-00440-RGK Doc # 39 Filed: 11/17/21 Page 16 of 22 - Page ID # 727

consultative activities of daily living (Filing 19-2, Tr. 33-39). Substantial evidence supports his

finding that Plaintiff could perform a range of unskilled, medium work.

ds the ALJ should have accounted for his visual impairment in assessing his RFC. See Filing 33) at 2, 5-12, 14-17. However, [t]he RFC assessment considers only functional limitations and restrictions that result determinable impairment or combination of -8P, 1996 WL 374184, at *1 (July 2, 1996). In this case, the ALJ determined at step two 6

that Plaintiff did not have a medically determinable visual impairment (Filing 19-2, Tr. 30-31). Thus, the ALJ properly excluded visual -2, Tr. 34).

Further, the record does not support visual limitations. In particular, the

to read and complete paperwork without any assistive device, use a microwave and cell phone, maintain his personal hygiene, go shopping, and use a computer (Filing 19-2, Tr. 30; Filing 19-6, Tr. 208; Filing 19-7, Tr. 390-391). He maintained a valid driver -2, Tr. 30; Filing 19-7, Tr. 390, 413). The evidence also showed that Plaintiff was not noted as using a cane at medical appointments during the relevant period, and staff at the homeless shelter stated that Plaintiff had no trouble navigating the large facility without a stick and he was also able to walk outside the facility without an assistive device (Filing 19-2, Tr. 31; Filing 19-7, Tr. 391). Although Plaintiff alleged a visual impairment, and reported limited vision at a medical appointment, the record showed that he was not visually impaired as alleged.

6 he has not shown reversible error. The ALJ cited to extensive evidence in determining that Plaintiff had not established a medically determinable visual impairment or, in the alternative, statutory blindness pursuant to Listing 2.02 (Filing 19-2, Tr. 30- not show that visual limitations affected his RFC.

8:20-cv-00440-RGK Doc # 39 Filed: 11/17/21 Page 17 of 22 - Page ID # 728

2021 | Cited 0 times | D. Nebraska | November 17, 2021

-7, 9-10, 15-

17. In particular, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff received treatment for seizures only once during the relevant period (Filing 19-2, Tr. 35). He also noted that the record included no evidence of regularly occurring seizures (Filing 19-2, Tr. 36). Despite the limited evidence, the ALJ included seizure precautions, e.g., no climbing of ladders or other exposure to unprotected heights and no operation of motor vehicles (Filing 19-2, Tr. 34). These restrictions adequately account for any functional limitat 7

The ALJ also properly considered functional limitations resulting from - Br. (Filing 33) at 2-5, 7-11, 14-17. Specifically, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff received

very limited medical treatment during the relevant period (Filing 19-2, Tr. 36). Plaintiff did not offer any explanation for why he did not seek free or low-cost treatment (Filing 19-2-, Tr. 36). The evidence of re allegation of violent or psychotic behavior, as the available evidence showed an

absence of psychotic symptoms, appropriate behavior, and good response to medication (Filing 19-2, Tr. 37, 72, 83-84; Filing 19-7, Tr. 313-323, 329-342, 367- 368, 385, 430). The ALJ nonetheless restricted Plaintiff to the performance of simple, straightforward, and uncomplicated tasks; incidental and superficial social interaction; and routine supervision and routine changes in the workplace (Filing 19-2, Tr. 34). Plaintiff has not met his burden of showing that additional mental restrictions were warranted.

Buford v. Colvin, 824 F.3d 793, 796 (8th Cir. 2016). The ALJ was not required to include additional functional limitations when the record did not support them.

7 The ALJ found no other medically determinable physical impairments (Filing 19- limitations in assessing his RFC.

8:20-cv-00440-RGK Doc # 39 Filed: 11/17/21 Page 18 of 22 - Page ID # 729

-Five Finding

In his third allegation of error, Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred in relying on VE testimony based on the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT). See P (Filing 33) at 3, 13-15, 17, 21. Specifically, he alleges that the DOT is categorically

vocational profile and RFC would be capable of performing cannot serve as

sub Again, this allegation lacks merit.

2021 | Cited 0 times | D. Nebraska | November 17, 2021

See Pickney

v. Chater, 96 F. all the limitations he found warranted (Filing 19-2, Tr. 34, 101). The VE testified

experience could perform the jobs of kitchen helper, counter supply worker, and lab

equipment cleaner at the medium exertional level (Filing 19-2, Tr. 102). The ALJ properly relied upon VE testimony in this case, and substantial evidence supports See Moore v. Astrue, 623 F.3d 599, 604 (8th Cir. 2010).

Contrary to Plaintiff's argument, the Code of Federal Regulations provides that the DOT is a reliable source of job information:

When we determine that unskilled, sedentary, light, and medium jobs exist in the national economy (in significant numbers either in the region where you live or in several regions of the country), we will take administrative notice of reliable job information available from various governmental and other publications ... [including] Dictionary of Occupational Titles, published by the Department of Labor. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1566(d)(1). The Eighth Circuit also recognizes the DOT as a proper source for job descriptions. See Thomas v. Berryhill, 881 F.3d 672, 678 (8th Cir. 2018). Thus, the VE did not err in relying on the DOT, and the ALJ, in turn, properly findings at step five of the sequential evaluation.

8:20-cv-00440-RGK Doc # 39 Filed: 11/17/21 Page 19 of 22 - Page ID # 730

In his fourth allegation of error, Plaintiff argues the ALJ should have further responsibility to provide specific medical evidence to support his claim. 20 C.F.R. §

416.912(a); see Cox v. Barnhart, 471 F.3d 902, 907 (8th Cir. 2006). The burden of proof remains at all times on the claimant to prove disability and present the strongest case possible. Thomas v. Sullivan, 928 F.2d 255, 260 (8th Cir. 1991). The ALJ is only required to develop a reasonably complete record. Clark v. Shalala, 28 F.3d 828, 830-831 (8th Cir. 1994). In determining whether an ALJ fully and fairly developed the record, the proper inquiry is whether the record contained sufficient evidence for the ALJ to make an informed decision. Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 749-750 (8th Cir. 2001); Anderson v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 777, 779 (8th Cir. 1995).

Here, the record contained sufficient evidence for the ALJ to make an informed decision regarding the extent impairments. In addition to the available medical records (Filing 19-7, 307-323, 329-

342, 354-357, 360-361, 363, 365, 367-368, 370-383, 385, 394, 396-400, 402, 404- 405, 415-418, 421, 430), the ALJ had the benefit of a prior consultative - 3, Tr. 110-111, 113-114, 117-120; Filing 19-7, Tr. 410-414), an investigative report from the Cooperative Disability Investigations unit (Filing 19-7, Tr.

2021 | Cited 0 times | D. Nebraska | November 17, 2021

387-392), function reports from Plaintiff and a third party (Filing 19-6, Tr. 206-213, 219-227), -6, Tr. 274), and hearing testimony from Plaintiff describing his alleged impairments and limitations, medical treatment, and activity level (Filing 19-2, Tr. 54-55, 60-100). Thus, the ALJ had an adequate basis for making his disability determination.

Plaintiff does not specify what additional evidence was necessary to develop the record in his case. See George v. Astrue (rejecting allegation that the ALJ failed to develop the record on the basis that

claimant failed to specify what records the ALJ should have sought). At one point in his brief, Plaintiff even avers that the ALJ had sufficient evidence to make a 8:20-cv-00440-RGK Doc # 39 Filed: 11/17/21 Page 20 of 22 - Page ID # 731 included for the decision- Id. at 1. Reversal for failure to develop the record is proper only where such failure

is unfair or prejudicial. See Haley, 258 F.3d at 748; Onstad v. Shalala, 999 F.2d alleged failure to develop the record resulted in prejudice and has therefore provided

Ellis v. Barnhart, 392 F.3d 988, 994 (8th Cir. 2005).

In his final allegation of error, Plaintiff claims he was not afforded a fair -2, 6-8, 11-12, 16, 19, 21. Specifically, Plaintiff argues the ALJ should have postponed the hearing so Plaintiff could obtain representation, and he complains the ALJ did not permit him to call a lay witness to testify on his behalf. There is no merit to these arguments.

Plaintiff received multiple written notices advising him of his right to have a representative at the hearing in August 2018 and July 2019 (Filing 19-4, Tr. 133, 149, 154-155). See Shepherd v. Chater, 1996 WL 224104, at *1 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding that claimant knowingly and intelligently waived representation where she received four notices informing her of her right to representation). At the February 2021 hearing, the ALJ advised Plaintiff of his right to a representative again (Filing 19-2, Tr. 56-59). He offered to recess the hearing to allow Plaintiff additional time to obtain an attorney (Filing 19-2, Tr. 57-58). Instead, Plaintiff elected to continue with the hearing (Filing 19- request, and to present himself at his scheduled hearing and testify, nothing indicates

that his recognized mental impairments rendered him unable to make a competent waiver of his right to representation. Plaintiff was fully aware of his right to be represented at his hearing but waived that right. See Frederick v. Saul, 2020 WL 7029508, at *10 (D. Neb. Nov. 30, 2020) (finding a knowing waiver where the ALJ sentation at the hearing and there was no

8:20-cv-00440-RGK Doc # 39 Filed: 11/17/21 Page 21 of 22 - Page ID # 732

indication that claimant lacked the mental capacity to understand her right to representation).

2021 | Cited 0 times | D. Nebraska | November 17, 2021

Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ prevented him from calling his mother as a witness during the administrative he Plaintiff did not ask the ALJ to call any witnesses (Filing 19-2, Tr. 54-105). In

addition, the record already included the October 2019 written statement from -6, Tr. 274). Plaintiff has not shown that his mother would have provided evidence that was not duplicative of his own testimony or of her written statement. See HALLEX I-2-6-60(B)

VI. CONCLUSION The court finds that substantial evidence on the record as a whole and is not contrary to law. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff's Motion for an Order Reversing the Commissioner's Decision

(Filing 33) is denied. 2. Motion to Affirm the Commissioner's Decision (Filing 37) is

granted. 3. Judgment will be entered by separate document providing that the decision

of the Commissioner is affirmed. Dated this 17th day of November 2021.

BY THE COURT:

Richard G. Kopf Senior United States District Judge 8:20-cv-00440-RGK Doc # 39 Filed: 11/17/21 Page 22 of 22 - Page ID # 733