



Whitener v. The Rutherford County Detention Center et al

2021 | Cited 0 times | W.D. North Carolina | September 21, 2021

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

ASHEVILLE DIVISION CIVIL CASE NO. 1:21-cv-00048-MR

RONNIE DALE WHITENER,)

Plaintiff,)

vs.)

RUTHERFORD COUNTY DETENTION) CENTER, et al.,) ORDER

Defendants.) _____)

THIS MATTER is before the Court on initial review of the pro se Complaint. [Doc. 1]. Several Motions are also pending. [Docs. 4, 7, 8, 14, 15]. The Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis. [Doc. 13].

The pro se Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), and North Carolina law, 1

addressing incidents that allegedly occurred while he was a pretrial detainee at the Rutherford County Detention Center. 2

[Doc. 1]. The Plaintiff names as Defendants: RCDC ; Chris

1 The Court also liberally construes the Complaint as raising a claim pursuant to the Health -171, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996). 2 The Plaintiff is presently incarcerated in the Tennessee Department of Corrections. Francis, the Rutherford County Sheriff ; John Doe 1, an RCDC administrator; John Doe 2, an RCDC captain; John Doe 3, an RCDC sergeant; John Does 4 and 5, RCDC correctional officers; RCDC Health Care Provider; Jane Doe 1, the RCDC medical administrator; Jane Doe 2, the RCDC medical director; Jane Doe 3, an RCDC physician; and Jane Doe 4, an RCDC nurse practitioner. [Id.]. In his Complaint, the Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment, compensatory and punitive damages, a jury trial, the costs of this action, and any other relief the court deems just, proper, and equitable. [Id.



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at 20-21]. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must review the Complaint to determine whether it is subject to dismissal on the relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who

see 28 U.S.C. § from governmental entities, officers, or employees).

In its frivolity review, a court must determine whether the Complaint raises an indisputably meritless legal theory or is founded upon clearly baseless factual contentions, such as fantastic or delusional scenarios. *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989). Furthermore, a pro se complaint must be construed liberally. *Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). However, the liberal construction requirement will not permit a district court to ignore a clear failure to allege facts in his complaint which set forth a claim that is cognizable under federal law. *Servs.*, 901 F.2d 387 (4 th

Cir. 1990). III. DISCUSSION

A. Federal Tort Claims Act The Plaintiff appears to assert claims under the Federal Tort Claims See Doc. 1 at 2]. The FTCA affords a limited, conditional waiver of sovereign immunity by the United States government for the torts of Federal government employees committed within the scope of their employment. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671 et seq.; see also *Muth v. United States*, 1 F.3d 246, 249 (4 th

Cir. 1993). The incidents in this lawsuit allegedly occurred at RCDC and all of the Defendants appear to be county employees. No federal actors are involved claims pursuant to the FTCA are therefore dismissed with prejudice as

frivolous and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. B. HIPAA The Plaintiff alludes to his right to have medical information kept private, and alleges that medical records in violation of his constitutional rights. [Doc. 1 at 17].

To the extent that the Plaintiff attempts to assert a claim under HIPAA, it is dismissed because HIPAA does not create a private right of action. *Payne v. Taslimi*, 998 F.3d 648 (4 th

Cir. 2020). Accordingly, to the extent that the Plaintiff attempts to assert a HIPAA claim, such claim is dismissed with prejudice.

C. Section 1983 To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that he was Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999).

1. RCDC The Plaintiff names as a Defendant the RCDC, the jail facility at which he was held in pretrial detention. [Doc. 1 at 2].



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In order to successfully allege a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the the plaintiff's constitutional rights. Rule 17(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that a party's capacity to be sued is determined by the law of the state in which the District Court is held. Under North Carolina law, unless a statute provides to the contrary, only persons in being may be sued. *McPherson v. First & Citizens Nat. Bank of Elizabeth City*, 240 N.C. 1, 18, 81 S.E.2d 386 (1954). Jails and detention centers, therefore, may not be sued. *Brooks v. Pembroke City Jail*, 722 F.Supp. 1294, 1301 (E.D.N.C.1989) am The RCDC is not a person under § 1983, and

accordingly, the § 1983 claims against it are dismissed with prejudice.

2. Healthcare Provider The Plaintiff names as a Defendant the Healthcare Provider which allegedly employed Jane Does 1 through 4. [See Doc. 1 at 4].

In *Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services*, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the Supreme Court held that a municipal corporation cannot be saddled with section 1983 liability via respondeat superior alone. This holding is equally applicable to the liability of private corporations. *Powell v. Shopco Laurel Co.*, 678 F.2d 504, 506 (4th

Cir. 1982). The Plaintiff alleges that Jane Does 1 through 4 acted improperly in their care of Plaintiff. [Doc. 1 at 5-7, 9]. However, the Plaintiff alleges no specific conduct by the Healthcare Provider or any custom or policy of the Healthcare Provider that resulted in a deprivation of his constitutional rights. The Plaintiff essentially seeks to hold the Healthcare Provider liable because it alleged employed the individuals who made decisions with which he disagrees. Such an allegation is insufficient to state a claim against a private company under § 1983. See *Powell*, 678 F.2d at 505 06 (dismissing a claim against the private employer of a security guard under § 1983). The Healthcare Provider are therefore dismissed without prejudice.

3. Official Capacity Claims The Plaintiff asserts claims against Sheriff Francis and the other RCDC employees in their official capacities. [Doc. 1 at 2-5].

The claims against the deputy Defendants in their official capacities are duplicative of the claims against Sheriff Francis. See *Love-Lane v. Martin*, 355 F.3d 766, 783 (4th Cir. 2004); *Carpenter v. Trammel*, No. 1:18- CV-00016-MR-WCM, 2019 WL 2088424, at *5 (W.D.N.C. May 13, 2019). Accordingly, the official capacity claims against the deputy Defendants are dismissed.

As for the official capacity claim against Sheriff Francis, suits against sheriffs in their official capacity are in substance claims against the office of the sheriff itself. *Gannt v. Whitaker*, 203 F.Supp.2d 503, 508 (M.D.N.C. Feb. Office policy or custom resulted in the violation of federal law. See *Monell v.*

, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) (holding that part in the violation of federal law); *Oklahoma City v. Tuttle*,



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471 U.S. 808,

818-20 (1985) (discussing same).

Here policy or custom played a part in the alleged violations of federal law. ff Francis in his official capacity will be dismissed without prejudice.

4. Individual Capacity Claims

i. Deliberate Indifference to a Serious Medical Need The Plaintiff appears to allege that Jane Doe nurse practitioner and Jane Doe physician were deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need by misdiagnosing the Plaintiff and prescribing treatment that was inconsistent with his medical records, and that Sergeant John Doe and the two John Doe correctional officers were deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need by refusing to take Plaintiff to the Emergency Room for a second opinion when the Plaintiff expressed disagreement with medical alleged misdiagnosis. [Doc. 1 at 6-7]. The Eighth Amendment 3

encompasses a right to medical care for serious medical needs. See *Estelle v. Gamble*, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976). To state a claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, a plaintiff must show that he had serious medical needs and that the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to those needs. *Heyer v. United States Bureau of Prisons*, 849 F.3d 202, 210 (4 th

Cir. 2017) (citing *Iko v. Shreve*, 535 F.3d 225, 241 (4 th

been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so

obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a Iko, 535 F.3d at 241 (internal quotation marks omitted). To constitute deliberate indifference treatment [a prisoner receives] must be so grossly incompetent, inadequate,

or excessive to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental Miltier v. Beorn, 896 F.2d 848, 851 (4 th

Cir. 1990), overruled on other grounds by *Farmer v. Brennan*, 511 U.S. 825 (1994). However, mere negligence or malpractice does not violate the Eighth Amendment. Miltier,

3 Because the Plaintiff was a pre-trial detainee at the relevant times, his deliberate indifference claims are properly brought under the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Eighth Amendment. See *City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp.*, 463 U.S. 239 (1983). However, the Fourth Circuit has long applied the Eighth Amendment deliberate See, e.g., *Mays v. Sprinkle*, 992 F.3d 295 (4 th



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Cir. 2021); Young v. City of Mount Ranier, 238 F.3d 567 (4 th Cir. 2001); Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692 (4 th

Cir. 1999); Belcher v. Oliver, 898 F.2d 32 (4 th

Cir. 1990). 896 F.2d at 852. Further, m exceptional cir Scinto v. Stansberry, 841 F.3d 219, 225 (4 th

Cir. 2016) (quoting Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 840 (4 th

Cir. 1985)). To establish a deliberate indifference claim against non-medical personnel, a prisoner must show that the non-medical personnel failed to promptly provide needed medical treatment, deliberately interfered with prison doctors treatment, or tacitly authorized or were indifferent to prison physicians misconduct. Miltier, 896 F.2d at 854. Because most prison officials are not trained medical personnel, they are entitled to rely on the opinions, judgment, and expertise of medical personnel concerning the course of treatment that the medical personnel deem necessary and appropriate for the prisoner. Id.; see Shakka v. Smith, 71 F.3d 162, 167 (4 th Cir. 1995) (finding that, if prison officials had contradicted medical Pickens v. Lewis, 2018 WL 2187051

(W.D.N.C. May 11, 2018) (holding that prison officials without medical omitted). Here, the Plaintiff has failed to state a deliberate indifference claim against the Jane Doe nurse practitioner and Jane Doe physician because the Plaintiff has alleged only his disagreement with their diagnosis and prescribed treatment. Such allegations do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Further, the Plaintiff has failed to state a deliberate indifference claim against the John Doe sergeant and John Doe correctional officers because these Defendants are non-medical correctional personnel who were , diagnosis, and treatment plan. Therefore, claims of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need will be dismissed without prejudice.

ii. Unwanted Medical Treatment The Plaintiff alleges that he told Sergeant John Doe and the two John Doe correctional officers that he was refusing the medical care prescribed by the Jane Doe nurse practitioner, i.e. Tylenol, a liquid diet, and 10 days of segregation for observation, but that Sergeant John Doe and the John Doe correctional officers would not accept the refusal and forced him to comply. 4 [Doc. 1 at 6].

4 The Plaintiff does not appear to allege that he expressed his refusal to the Jane Doe nurse practitioner or Jane Doe physician. ected liberty interest Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990). This liberty interest survives conviction and incarceration. King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 222 (4 th

Cir. 2016); see Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221 22 (1990) (recognizing an individual Hogan v. Carter, 85



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F.3d 1113, 1116 (4 th

Cir. 1996) (en banc) (citing Harper, 494 U.S. 221 22). In this context, prison officials may override this right when treatment is Harper, 494 U.S. at 223 (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 89). right claimed to have been infringed is fundamental, and the State under

other circumstances would have been required to satisfy a more rigorous Id. (citation omitted).

Taking the allegations as true for the purposes of initial review, and the Court concludes that the Plaintiff has stated a due process claim sufficient to pass initial review against Sergeant John Doe and the two John Doe correctional officers for forcing him to undergo unwanted medical treatment. Accordingly, this claim will be allowed to proceed at this time.

iii. Excessive Force The Plaintiff appears to allege that Sergeant John Doe used excessive force while escorting the Plaintiff to segregation, and that the two John Doe correctional officers failed to intervene in these uses of excessive force. [Doc. 1 at 7-9].

of excessive force tha Graham v. Connor, 490

U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989). To state an excessive force claim, a pretrial Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389

Id. In determining whether the force was

perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, including what the officer Id. (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). Considerations that bear on the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the force include: the relationship between the need for injury; any effort made by the officer to temper or limit the amount of force; the severity of the security problem at issue; the threat reasonably perceived by the officer; and whether the plaintiff was actively resisting. Id.

Taking the allegations as true for the purposes of initial review, and construing all inferences in the the Court concludes that the Plaintiff has stated an excessive force claim against Sergeant John Doe, and a failure to intervene claim against the two John Doe correctional officers. These claims therefore survive initial review.

iv. Retaliation The Plaintiff appears to allege that Sergeant John Doe and the John Doe correctional officers used excessive force against him in retaliation for Plaintiff expressing his disagreement with medical staff treatment plan. [Doc. 1 at 7-9].

affirmative right to speak, but also the right to be free from retaliation by a



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Suarez Corp. v. McGraw, 202 F.3d 676, 685 (4 th

Cir. 2000). Prison officials may not retaliate against an inmate for exercising a constitutional right. See Hudspeth v. Figgins, 584 F.2d 1345, 1347 (4 th

Cir.1978). In order to state a colorable retaliation claim d in protected First Amendment activity, (2) the defendant[] took some action that adversely affected [his] First Amendment rights, and (3) there was a causal relationship Martin v. Duffy, 858 F.3d 239, 249 (4 th

Cir. 2017) (quoting Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 499 (4 th

Cir. 2005)). In the act of discipline by prison offic Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72,

74 (4 th

Cir. 1994). Taking the allegations as true for the purposes of initial review, and construing all inferences in Plaintiff the Court concludes that the Plaintiff has stated a retaliation claim against Sergeant John Doe and the two John Doe correctional officers that is sufficient to survive initial review.

v. Conditions of Confinement The Plaintiff alleges that: he was placed in segregation for nearly two weeks without due process for medical observation and for refusing medical and correctional orders, and that [Doc. 1 at 14].

Tate v. Parks, 791 F.

App x 387, 390 (4 th

Cir. 2019) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979)). An individual pretrial detainee may raise a substantive due process disproportionate or arbitrary that they are not related to legitimate

Id. (citing Williamson v. Stirling, 912 F.3d 154, 174-76 (4 th

Cir. 2018)). a detainee must show that the challenged treatment or conditions were either

(1) imposed with an express intent to punish, or (2) not reasonably related to a legitimate nonpunitive objective, in which case an intent to punish may be Id. (citing Williamson, 912 F.3d at 178). The Plaintiff alleges that he was placed in segregation for two weeks for medical observation by the Jane Doe nurse and Jane Doe physician, and that the segregation was also punishment for disagreeing with the medical . [Doc. 1 at 17- 18]. These allegations are insufficient to state a plausible due process claim, as a medical segregation order is a legitimate nonpunitive objective that preceded his



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disagreement and attempted refusal for which he alleges he was punished without due process. allegation that his isolated is too vague and conclusory to state confinement violated due process are therefore dismissed.

5. Supplemental Jurisdiction The Plaintiff raises a number of claims under North Carolina law. Federal district courts may entertain claims not otherwise within their [federal-court competence] that they form part of the same case or

1367(a). To exercise supplemental jurisdiction, a United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs,

383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). When a district court dismisses all claims Artis v. Dist. of Columbia, 138 S.Ct. 594,

595 (2018); see § 1367(c)(3). A district court may also dismiss the related state claims if there is a good reason to decline jurisdiction. See § 1367(c)(1), (2), and (4).

i. Assault and Battery The Plaintiff appears to assert that Sergeant John Doe and the two John Doe correctional officers committed an assault and battery by making him fear that they were about to harm him, and then by using excessive force against him. [Doc. 1 at 12]. North Carolina assault is an offer to show violence to another without striking him, and battery is the carrying of the threat into effect by the infliction of a blow. See generally Dickens v. Puryear, 302 N.C. 437, 445, 276 S.E.2d 325, 330 (1981). While a civil action for assault is available under North Carolina law against one who uses force for the accomplishment of a legitimate purpose such as justifiable arrest, the use of such force under the given circumstances must be excessive for the claimant to prevail. Myrick v. Cooley, 91 N.C.App. 2 Jordan v. Civil Service Bd., 153 N.C.App. 691,

698, 570 S.E.2d 912, 918 (2002) (quoting Clem v. Corbeau, 284 F.3d 543, 550 (4 th

Cir. 2002)). The Plaintiff has plausibly stated assault and battery claims under North Carolina law, and these claims involve the same incidents as the excessive force and failure to intervene claims that have passed initial review. The Court will, accordingly, exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

ii. Medical Negligence The Plaintiff appears to assert a medical malpractice claim against the Jane Doe nurse practitioner and Jane Doe physician. [Doc. 1 at 12]. the standard of care, (2) breach of the standard of care, (3) proximate

Turner v. Duke Univ., 325 N.C. 152, 162, 381 S.E.2d 706 (1989).

Assuming arguendo that the Plaintiff has plausibly alleged a medical negligence claim under North Carolina law, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over it at this time. The medical negligence claim against the Jane Doe nurse practitioner and Jane Doe physician is not



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adequately related to the § 1983 claims that have passed initial review against the John Doe sergeant and two John Doe correctional officers. Further, such claim would require extensive expert testimony of an entirely different nature than that needed to adjudicate constitutional issues. It is likely, in this case, that the medical malpractice claim would substantially predominate over the claims over which the Court has original jurisdiction. See, e.g., *De La Garza-Montemayor v. Hassoun*, No. CIV-18-1120-HE, 2019 WL 923744, at *4 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 7, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, No. CIV-18-1120-HE, 2019 WL 921459 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 25, 2019) -law medical malpractice claims that involved a different set of defendants, circumstances, and facts from the § 1983 excessive force claim and would substantially predominate the c claims are dismissed without prejudice to refile such claims in a proper

state forum.

iii. Negligence The Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Sergeant John Doe and the two John Doe correctional officers failed to use reasonable care to protect him from physical assault and from the Jane Doe nurse practitioner and Jane Doe . [Doc. 1 at 11-12].

action, [a plaintiff] must offer evidence of the essential elements of *Blackwell v. Hatley*, 202 N.C.App. 208, 212, 688 S.E.2d 742, 746 (2010); *Camalier v. Jeffries*, 340 N.C. 699, 460 S.E.2d 133, 136 (1995). is the failure to exercise the degree of care which a reasonable and prudent

person would exercise under similar conditions. A defendant is liable for his negligence if the negligence is the proximate cause of injury to a person to *Hart v. Ivey*, 332 N.C. 299, 420 S.E.2d 174 (1992) (internal citations omitted).

The Plaintiff has minimally stated a negligence claim against Sergeant John Doe and the two John Doe correctional officers with regard to the excessive force incidents. However, the negligence claim based on Jane will be dismissed because no claim of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need has passed initial review. The Court will, accordingly, exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the alleged use of excessive force at this time.

iv. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress The Plaintiff appears to allege that Sergeant John Doe and the two emotional distress by engaging in the purposefully outrageous acts, and that

. [Doc. 1 at 12].

extreme and outrageous conduct, (2) which is intended to cause and does

cause (3) *Dickens v. Puryear*, 302 N.C. 437, 452, 276 S.E.2d 325, 335 (1981) (citations and quotation marks omitted). The severe emotional distress required for intentional infliction of emotional psychosis, chronic depression, phobia, or any other type of severe or



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disabling emotional or mental condition which may be generally recognized Piro v. McKeever, 245 N.C. App. 412, 416, 782 S.E.2d 367, 371 (2016), a 369 N.C. 291, 794 S.E.2d 501 (citations omitted). Shreve v. Duke

Power Co., 85 N.C. App. 253, 257, 354 S.E.2d 357, 359 (1987) (citation and quotations omitted). medication for emotional stress are too vague and conclusory to state a

plausible claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. Assuming arguendo that the Defendant Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege that their actions were intended to

cause, and did cause, a recognized severe and disabling emotional disorder. This claim is therefore dismissed without prejudice.

6. Pending Motions The Plaintiff has filed several pro se motions that will be addressed in turn.

First, the Plaintiff has filed a Motion to Appoint Counsel [Doc. 4]. There is no absolute right to the appointment of counsel in civil actions such as this one. to require the Court to seek the assistance of a private attorney for a plaintiff

who is unable to afford counsel. Miller v. Simmons, 814 F.2d 962, 966 (4 th Cir. 1987). The Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate the existence of exceptional circumstances that would warrant the appointment of counsel and denied.

Second, Plaintiff has filed Requests for Admissions [Doc. 7] and Request for Production of Documents [Doc. 8] that have been docketed as Motions. These filings appear to be routine discovery requests that are premature and have been misdirected to the Court. See LCvR Court-ordered and enforceable discovery does not commence until issuance CvR disclosures, designations of expert witnesses and their reports, discovery requests or responses thereto, deposition transcripts, or other discovery material unless: (1) directed to do so by the Court; (2) such materials are necessary for use in an in-court proceeding; or (3) such materials are filed in support of, or in oppo The Motions seeking discovery will therefore be denied. Discovery will commence upon the

Third, the Plaintiff has filed a Motion to Add Certificate in Support of In Forma Pauperis [Doc. 14]. This Motion is moot because Plaintiff has already been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. [See Doc. 13]. Fourth, the Plaintiff has filed a Motion [Doc. 15] in which he asks the Court to allow the Clerk to update him on the . He also appears The request for a case

status report from the Clerk is moot, as this Order has addressed the issue. As to the is denied insofar as the Plaintiff appears to seek legal advice from the Court.

Moreover, the Court is not responsible for providing pro se litigants with legal materials. However,



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the Court will direct the Clerk to provide Plaintiff with a copy of th Local Rules as a courtesy. IV.
CONCLUSION

In sum, for the imposition of unwanted medical treatment in violation of due process, the use of excessive force and failure to intervene, and retaliation have passed initial review against Sergeant John Doe and the two John Doe correctional officers. The Court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the negligence against these Defendants pursuant to North Carolina law. The

FTCA and HIPAA, and the claims against RCDC, are dismissed with prejudice; the remaining claims are dismissed without prejudice. The Court will allow the Plaintiff thirty (30) days to amend his Complaint, if he so chooses, to correct the deficiencies identified in this Order and to otherwise properly state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Any Amended Complaint will be subject to all timeliness and procedural requirements and will supersede the Complaint. Piecemeal amendment will not be permitted. Should Plaintiff fail to timely amend his Complaint in accordance with this Order, the matter will proceed only against Defendants Sergeant John Doe and the two John Doe correctional officers as set forth .

ORDER IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that: 1. The claims against Sergeant John Doe and the two John Doe

correctional officers have passed initial review for the imposition of unwanted medical care in violation of due process, the use of excessive force and failure to intervene, and retaliation. The Court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the against these Defendants for assault and battery and negligence

under North Carolina law. 2. The claims pursuant to FTCA and HIPAA, and against

RCDC are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 3. The remaining claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 4. The Plaintiff shall have thirty (30) days in which to amend the

Complaint in accordance with the terms of this Order. If the Plaintiff fails to so amend his Complaint, the matter will proceed against Sergeant John Doe and the John Doe correctional officers as provided in this Order. 5. Motion to Appoint Counsel [Doc. 4] is DENIED. 6. Requests for Admissions [Doc. 7] and Request for

Production of Documents [Doc. 8] are DENIED as premature. 7. Motion to Add Certificate in Support of In Forma

Pauperis [Doc. 14] is DENIED as moot. 8. Motion [Doc. 15] is DENIED. 9. The Clerk of Court is respectfully instructed to mail a blank § 1983



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prisoner complaint form, , Local Rules to the Plaintiff along with a copy of this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Signed: September 21, 2021

