



Johnson v. Caldwell et al

2019 | Cited 0 times | W.D. Virginia | July 12, 2019

CLERK'S OFFICE U. S. DISTRICT COURT

AT ROANOKE, VA

FILED JUL 12 2019 J.C.P., CLERK BY :

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

ROANOKE DIVISION

WALTER L. JOHNSON,

Civil Action No. 7:19CV00465 MEMORANDUM OPINION By: Hon. Glen E. Comarden or United States District Judge Plaintiff, V. DONALD CALDWELL, et al.,

Defendants.

Walter L. Johnson, proceeding pro se, commenced this action by filing a formal complaint against Donald Caldwell, the Commonwealth's Attorney for the City of Roanoke, and Douglas Huber, a Virginia State Police Special Agent. The plaintiff has not paid the filing fee but will be granted leave to proceed pro se for purposes of initial review of his complaint. For the following reasons, the court concludes that the case must be dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

Background The following facts are taken from the complaint and the attached exhibits. See *Gaines v. Valley Cemetery Services, Inc.*, 822 F.3d 159, 166 (4th Cir. 2016) (noting that the court may consider exhibits to a complaint in assessing its sufficiency).

In September of 2013, law enforcement officers executed a search warrant at the plaintiff's residence as part of an investigation by the Commonwealth of Virginia State Police. During the search, computers, hard drives, photographs, and other items of personal property were seized by law enforcement officers. Ultimately, no charges were brought as a result of the search.

On July 14, 2017, Caldwell, on behalf of the Commonwealth, moved the Circuit Court for the



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City of Roanoke to order the destruction of 24 items seized during the investigation. The Commonwealth represented to the Court that he listed items (having been contained in自然证据) were seized or cleaned for any future commercial use. On July 14, 2017 Order, Dkt. No. 2-1. The Circuit Court granted the motion and ordered that agents of the Virginia State Police destroy said such items listed on the attached docket at a time and in a manner that is most practical. "I.d. (capitalization omitted). The Court also rejected the filing of a certificate upon completion of the destruction.

The Commonwealth filed the requested certificate of destruction on September 26, 2017. The certificate indicates that the specified items of personal property were destroyed by Hubert on September 25, 2017, pursuant to the Circuit Court's order. See Certificate of Destruction, Dkt. No. 2-1 (Gavel issued to attorney or der of the Roanoke City Circuit Court dated July 14, 2017, the following items were destroyed at 1:30 p.m. on the 25th day of September, 2017... by Virginia State Police Special Agent Douglas R. Hubel t').

At some point thereafter, the plaintiff contacted the Virginia State Police regarding the items seized from his residence. On June 11, 2019, a representative of the Virginia State Police email advised him that the property had been destroyed pursuant to a court order issued on July 14, 2017. certificate of destruction.

The plaintiff subsequently received a copy of the order and the

On June 24, 2019, the plaintiff filed a formal complaint against Caldwell and Hubert. The plaintiff filed a complaint that he was never advised that proceedings had been undertaken to deprive (him) of (his) property. "Complaint, 3, Dkt. No. 2. Consequently, the plaintiff filed a complaint that the defendant deprived him of his property without due process of law, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

2nd Amendment. He seeks to recover compensatory and punitive damages, and requests that the defendants be removed from their positions.

Standard of Review Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), which governs pro se proceedings, the court has a mandatory duty to screen initial filings. *Eriline Co. S.A. v. Johnson*, 440 F.3d 648, 656-57 (4th Cir. 2006). The court must dismiss a case if the court determines that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. "28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

The standard for reviewing a complaint for dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) are the same as those which apply when a defendant moves for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). *De' Lontae v. Ancelone*, 330 F.3d 630, 633 (4th Cir. 2003). Thus, in reviewing a complaint under this statute, the court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true



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and view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff if. Phillips v. Pitt County Mem. Hospital, 572 F. 3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009). To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations to raise a right to relief above the speculative level '' and which states a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. '' Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007).

Discussion Because the plaintiff's characterizes the act as one for violation of his right to due processes, the court considers the complaint as being brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 provides a cause of action against any person who, under color of state law, causes the deprivation of another person's rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For the following reasons, the court concludes that the plaintiff's complaint fails to state a plausible claim to relief under § 1983 against either of the named defendants.

Turning first to the claim that the Supreme Court has held that prosecutors are absolutely immune from damages liability when they act as advocates for the State. '' Savage v. Maryland, 896 F. 3d 260, 268 (4th Cir. 2018) (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-32 (1976)). Such immunity extends to certain types of acts that may be sociated with the judicial phase of the criminal process. '' Nero v. Mosby, 890 F. 3d 106, 117-18 (4th Cir. 2018) (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430-31). It typically extends beyond the criminal process to conduct in civil proceedings where a government attorney is operating in an enforcement role in initiating . . . judicial proceedings. '' Slickinger v. Govorchi, 463 F. 3d 518, 525 (6th Cir. 2006). To determine whether the prosecutor's conduct is covered by this approach, looking to the nature of the function performed, without regard to the identity of the actor who performed it. '' Savae, 896 F. 3d at 268 (internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, the court must focus on the conduct for which immunity is claimed, not on the harm that the conduct may have caused or the question whether it was lawful. '' Id. (quoting Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 271 (1993). When a prosecutor is functioning as an advocate for the State, it is clear that his or her actions are intentional as society would expect by absolute immunity. '' Id. (citing Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430-31).

Appling these principles, the court concludes that Plaintiff was acting in his role as an advocate for the Commonwealth when he requested the entry of the order directing the Virginia State Police to destroy the property seized from the plaintiff respondent. Courts have held that prosecutors were acting as an advocate for the State when they Gaveling motions as part of the judicial process. '' Elmore v. City of Greenwood, No. 3:13-cv-01755, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120416, at *20 (O.S.C. June 27, 2014); see also Carter v. Burch, 34 F. 3d 257, 263 (4th Cir. 1994) (and that these post-trial motions and preparations for appeal, Burch was still final motions as an

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4 advocate for the State, and not in any interest it gave or capacity.'). That is precisely what occurs here; Caldwell filed a motion for enforcement of property on behalf of the Commonwealth. Consistent with the foregoing decisions, the court concludes that Caldwell is absolutely immune from damages related to such action.

The court likewise concludes that Hubert is absolutely immune from liability since he acted pursuant to the Circuit Court's order in destroying the property seized from the plaintiff's residence. Courts have held that the law provides immunity for those whose actions are taken consistent with obedience to a judicial order or the direction of the court's decision. *McCray v. Maryland*, 456 F.2d 1, 5 (4th Cir. 1972); see also *Welch v. Saunders*, 720 F. App'x 476, 480 (10th Cir. 2017) (under the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity, officers charged with the duty of executing a facially valid court order enjoy absolute immunity from liability for damages in a lawsuit challenging conduct prescribed by that order).¹¹ (*quoting Moss v. Kopp*, 559 F.3d 1155, 1163 (10th Cir. 2009); *Roland v. Phillips*, 19 F.3d 552, 556 (11th Cir. 1994) ("[t]he general enforcement powers of the federal judiciary are absolute and cannot be abridged by statute, and the federal courts are not bound by state law principles of sovereign immunity or respondeat superior."))¹² He availed himself of immunoimmunity in such circumstances if he does not depend on the often-kiwi research of the law, checking court records, or doing anything beyond looking at the face of the order.¹³ *Welch*, 720 F. App'x at 481. *Thus*, for an order to be facially valid means simply that it is valid on its face.¹⁴ *Id.*; see also *Roland*, 19 F.3d at 556 ("[G]eneral facial validity does not mean general awfulness." An erroneous order can be valid.¹⁵) (*quoting Tlitzmeyer v. O'Tool*, 898 F.2d 1470, 1473 (10th Cir. 1990)).

In this case, the Circuit Court's order, on its face, expressly directed agents of the Virginia State Police to destroy 24 specific items seized from the plaintiff's residence. Hubert, a Special Agent with the Virginia State Police, acted pursuant to that order in destroying the listed items on

5 September 25, 2017. Because the plaintiff's challenge to the conduct prescribed by a facially valid court order, the court concludes that Hubert is absolutely immune from liability related to such conduct.

Finally, the court notes that federal district courts have the authority to . . . independently remove state officials from office.¹⁶ *Filles v. King*, No. 1:17-cv-01632, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154737, at *9 (N.D. Ala. July 31, 2018). Consequently, the plaintiff's request for injunctive relief is denied if neither states a claim upon which relief can be granted nor states a remedy will be had this court can award.¹⁷ JZ

Conclusion For the reasons stated, the court will grant the plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. However, the complaint will be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).

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The Clerk is directed to send copies of this memorandum opinion and the accompanying order to the plaintiff.

DATED: This 1st day of July

, 2019.

Senior United States District Judge

