



Safe Auto v. Oriental-Guillermo; Apl of: Jimenez

2019 | Cited 0 times | Supreme Court of Pennsylvania | August 20, 2019

[J-104-2018] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA MIDDLE DISTRICT

SAYLOR, C.J., BAER, TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, JJ.

SAFE AUTO INSURANCE COMPANY

v.

RENE ORIENTAL-GUILLERMO, RACHEL DIXON, PRISCILA JIMENEZ, LUIS JIMENEZ, ALLI LICONA AVILA AND IRIS VELAZQUEZ

APPEAL OF: PRISCILA JIMENEZ & LUIS JIMENEZ ::::::::::::::: No. 26 MAP 2018

Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court dated September 18, 2017 at No. 3226 EDA 2016 affirming the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County, Civil Division, dated September 13, 2016 at No. 2015-C- 1547

ARGUED: December 6, 2018

OPINION

JUSTICE TODD DECIDED: August 20, 2019 In this appeal by allowance, we consider the enforceability of an unlisted resident) in a personal automobile insurance policy. For the reasons

that follow, we conclude that the URDE at issue in this case is enforceable. Accordingly, we affirm the order of the Superior Court. On April 29, 2013, Rachel Dixon was driving a car owned by her boyfriend, Rene

Oriental- in which Priscila Jimenez was a passenger, and which was owned by Iris Velazquez, and operated by Alli Licon-Avila. At the time of the accident, Dixon resided with Policyholder, who had purchased a personal automobile insurance policy through . The Policy contains a URDE, which



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[J-104-2018] - 2 excludes from coverage any individuals who live with, but are not related to, the policyholder, and whom the policyholder does not specifically list as an additional driver

on the insurance policy. Specifically, the URDE at issue provides:

PART 1 - LIABILITY COVERAGE EXCLUSIONS LIABILITY COVERAGE AND OUR DUTY TO DEFEND DO NOT APPLY TO BODILY INJURY OR PROPERTY DAMAGE: 1. That occurs while your covered auto is being operated by a resident of your household or by a regular user of your covered auto, unless that person is listed as an additional driver on the Declarations Page.

Policy, at 6 (Reproduced . at 43a). It is undisputed that Dixon was not listed as an additional driver on the Policy.

Jimenez and her husband Luis (collectively, Appellants) filed a personal injury lawsuit against Dixon, Policyholder, and Licona-Avila. On May 13, 2015, Safe Auto filed a complaint against Dixon, Policyholder, and Appellants, seeking a declaratory judgment

regarding the enforceability of the URDE with respect to Dixon. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Safe Auto, finding the URDE unambiguous, valid, and enforceable, and concluding that Safe Auto has no duty under the Policy to defend or

indemnify Dixon in the underlying personal injury lawsuit. Appellants timely appealed to the Superior Court, arguing (1) that the trial court erred in holding the URDE is valid and enforceable; (2) that the URDE violates the provisions of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle

1 ; and (3) that the URDE violates public policy. 2 The Superior Court affirmed the order of the trial court in a divided, published opinion authored by Judge Alice Dubow. Safe Auto Ins. Co. v. Oriental-Guillermo, 170

1 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 1701 et seq. 2 Dixon and Policyholder are not parties to the instant appeal.

[J-104-2018] - 3 A.3d 1170 (Pa. Super. 2017). Concluding that the language of the Policy is unambiguous, and noting there is no dispute as to the material facts, the court first held

that the trial court properly determined that the exclusion applies and that Safe Auto is not obligated to defend Dixon. The court next considered Appellants s the

language of the MVFRL mandating that an owner of a motor vehicle ensure that all drivers of his vehicle are covered by insurance. Specifically, Section 1786(f) of the MVFRL provides: Operation of a motor vehicle without required financial responsibility. Any owner of a motor vehicle for which the existence of financial responsibility is a requirement for its legal operation shall not operate the



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motor vehicle or permit it to be operated upon a highway of this Commonwealth without the financial responsibility required by this chapter. 75 Pa.C.S. § 1786(f). Upon review of Section 178 obligation on the owner of a vehicle, and not the insurance company, to ensure that

Safe Auto, 170 A.3d at 1175. The court opined that holding an i le for providing insurance to the shift to the insurance company

unidentified risks there is no provision in the MVFRL suggesting that the legislature, in enacting the MVFRL, intended to do so. Id. Thus, the court rejected is contrary to the language of Section 1786(f).

The court further rejected that the URDE is contrary to the provisions of the MVFRL in light of its alleged similarity to a . 3 Appellants argued that the public policy underlying the NDE provisions of the

3 Section 1718(c) provides:

[J-104-2018] - 4 MVFRL is hat the insurance company must insure every individual who uses an Id. at 1176. However, observing that, similar to the

URDE at issue herein, an NDE permits a policyholder, in certain instances, to exclude from his policy certain individuals for whom the policyholder does not want to provide

coverage, the court found the policy implications of the NDE and the URDE were consistent. Specifically, both an NDE and a URDE allow the insured, in certain instances, to [] insurance. If the insured chooses not to purchase insurance for those drivers of his car,

the i Id. The court found this principle consistent with Section 1786(f) of the MVFRL, in which the legislature placed

the burden on the insured to make sure vehicle have insurance. Finally, the court rejected argument that the URDE is void against

public policy because it undermines the goal of maximum feasible restoration to accident victims. just one of many goals of

(c) Named Driver Exclusion.- An insurer or the first named insured may exclude any person or his personal representative from benefits under a policy enumerated in section 1711 or 1712 when any of the following apply: (1) The person is excluded from coverage while operating a motor vehicle in accordance with the act of June 5, 1968 (P.L. 140, No. 78), relating to the writing, cancellation of or refusal to renew policies of automobile insurance. (2) The first named insured has requested that the person be excluded from coverage while operating a motor vehicle. This paragraph shall only apply if



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the excluded person is insured on another policy of motor vehicle liability insurance.

75 Pa.C.S. § 1718(c).

[J-104-2018] - 5 the MVFRL. Id. Ultimately, the court concluded that the MVFRL does not anticipate always shifting the burden [to] insurance companies to discover the identities of resident,

non-family member insureds, who Id. at 1177.

President Judge Emeritus Ford Elliott authored a dissenting opinion wherein she

concluded that the URDE is contrary to Section 1786(f) of the MVFRL and con Id. at 1180 (Ford Elliott, P.J.E., dissenting). She suggested

that the MVFRL serves the dual purposes of (1) lowering the cost of insurance, which

allows those who operate a vehicle in the Commonwealth to do so affordably, and (2) protecting victims who are injured due to the operation of those vehicles. In her view, the insurer is in a better position to accept the risk related to its insured than is injured victim Id. at 1177. Progressive

Northern Ins. Co. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 898 A.2d 1116 (Pa. Super. 2006), Judge Ford Elliott opined that the legislature intended that insurance follow the vehicle,

rather than intending that policies covering a vehicle be limited by who is operating the vehicle. Safe Auto, 170 A.3d at 1179 (Ford Elliott, P.J.E., dissenting). She further suggested that e be

Id. Finally, to the extent that cost control has been viewed as the overriding goal of the MVFRL, Judge Ford Elliott suggested that this Court has signaled a willingness to

depart from that principle, noting that, in *Heller v. Pa. League of Cities and Municipalities*, 32 A.3d 1213 (Pa. 2011), we underinsured UIM coverage in an employer-purchased automobile insurance policy violated

public policy, and, in doing so, cautioned that the cost containment objective underlying

[J-104-2018] - 6 contractual provision that restricts coverage and purportedly lessens the cost of Id. at 1222.

Appellants filed a petition for allowance of appeal, and this Court granted review to consider the following issues, as framed by Appellants:



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a. Did the Superior Court err as a matter of law in finding that the [URDE] in a Personal Auto Policy is valid and enforceable and not violative of the terms and provisions of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1701, et. seq.?

b. Did the Superior Court err as a matter of law in finding that the [URDE] in a Personal Auto Policy is valid and enforceable and not violative of the public policy of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania as embodied in § 1786 of the [MVFRL], 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1786, which implicitly directs that all permissive

insurance policy?

Safe Auto Ins. Co. v. Oriental-Guillermo, 187 A.3d 204 (Pa. 2018) (order). As a preliminary matter, we note that the questions raised by Appellants present questions of law; thus, our scope of review is plenary and our standard of review is de novo. Heller, 32 A.3d at 1220. Additionally, it is well established that, in construing a

policy of insurance, a court is required to give plain meaning to a clear and unambiguous contract provision unless such provision violates the law or a clearly expressed public policy. Eichelman v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 711 A.2d 1006, 1008 (Pa. 1998).

When considering whether a contract violates public policy, we are mindful that public policy is more than a vague goal which may be used to circumvent the plain meaning of the contract. Rather,

[p]ublic policy is to be ascertained by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interest. there must be found definite indications in the law of the

sovereignty to justify the invalidation of a contract as contrary to that policy[.] . . . Only dominant public policy would justify

[J-104-2018] - 7 such action. In the absence of a plain indication of that policy through long governmental practice or statutory enactments, or of violations of obvious ethical or moral standards, the Court should not assume to declare contracts . . . contrary to public policy. The courts must be content to await legislative action. * * * It is only when a given policy is so obviously for or against the public health, safety, morals or welfare that there is a virtual unanimity of opinion in regard to it, that a court may constitute itself the voice of the community in so declaring [that the contract is against public policy]. Heller, 32 A.3d at 1220-21 (citations omitted and second alteration original). With the above standards in mind, we turn to the questions before us. With respect

to their first issue, Appellants claim that the URDE in the Policy violates the terms and provisions of the MVFRL. Specifically, they contend that the URDE is inconsistent with Sections 1786(a) and (f), which provide:



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§ 1786. Required financial responsibility

(a) General rule. Every motor vehicle of the type required to be registered under this title which is operated or currently registered shall be covered by financial responsibility.

* * * (f) Operation of a motor vehicle without required financial responsibility. Any owner of a motor vehicle for which the existence of financial responsibility is a requirement for its legal operation shall not operate the motor vehicle or permit it to be operated upon a highway of this Commonwealth without the financial responsibility required by this chapter. 75 Pa.C.S. § 1786(a), (f). 4

4 The ability to respond in damages for liability on account of accidents arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle in the amount of \$15,000 because of injury to one person in any one accident, in the amount of \$30,000 because of injury to two or more persons in any one accident and in the

[J-104-2018] - 8 Appellants acknowledge that Section 1786(a) requires that all vehicles be covered by insurance. However, they maintain there is no requirement in the MVFRL that a

vehicle owner identify all permissive users of his or her vehicle when obtaining insurance coverage. In this regard, they contend that the URDE is inconsistent with the terms of the MVFRL. As support for this assertion, Appellants point to another section of the

MVFRL, Section 1782, which provides, in part:

(a) General rule. Proof of financial responsibility may be furnished by filing evidence satisfactory to the department that all motor vehicles by motor vehicle liability insurance or by a program of self-

insurance as provided by section 1787 (relating to self- insurance) or other reliable financial arrangements. Id. § 1782(a) (emphasis added). the URDE improperly shifts the

burden of identifying all permissive users MVFRL does not require the same.

Further, citing the dissent below and the Superior C Progressive

Northern, supra, Appellants argue direct[s] that all 4. in the instant case [s] afoul of

the legislative of Section 1786(f), and places an unreasonable burden on

amount of \$5,000 because of damage to property of others in any one accident. Id. § 1702.

Furthermore, as any of the following: (1) An individual identified by name as an insured in a policy of motor vehicle liability insurance. (2) If residing in the household of the named insured: (i) a spouse or



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other relative of the named insured; or (ii) a minor in the custody of either the named insured or relative of the named insured. Id.

[J-104-2018] - 9 vehicle owners to e vehicle] do not fall within the sense, in that coverage is denied to -in fiancé, vehicle with permission, but would be afforded to Id. at 17-18.

In this regard, Appellants suggest that the id. at 11, and they point to a clause

in t

Anyone using your covered auto with the covered auto has the same rights and obligations that you have under this

coverage. However, this protection is not afforded to any regular or occasional user of your covered auto or to any resident of your household, unless that person is listed as an additional driver on the Declarations Page. Any change in regular operators, newly licensed drivers or residents in your household must be reported to us immediately. Policy, at 6 (R.R. at 43a) (emphasis added). 5 According to Appellants, the above- italicized language is further evidence that Safe Auto is attempting to restrict coverage

I Safe Auto first asserts that claim that the URDE is inconsistent with t provision of the Policy was not raised before the Superior Court and f review,

and, thus, is waived. Further, w Progressive Northern, Safe Auto asserts that Appellants quoted its language out of context, and that the Superior Court

therein did not suggest that Section 1786(f) implicitly directs the extension of coverage

5 The Pennsylvania Association for Justice filed an amicus brief in support of Appellants, presenting arguments identical to

[J-104-2018] - 10 f 6 Moreover, Safe Auto maintains that Progressive Northern is nonbinding, unpersuasive, and factually

Byoung Suk An v. Victoria Fire & Cas. Co., 113 A.3d 1283 (Pa. Super. 2015), in which the court upheld a substantially broader exclusion a than the one

at issue in this case. Safe Auto further argues that Appellants, in suggesting that an insurer is required

which penalizes vehicle owners for allowing their vehicles to be operated by individuals



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Safe Auto contends that ly covers all

permissive users of the vehicle, rather than flowing from Section 1786(f), actually conflicts with Section 1786(f), which places responsibility on the vehicle owner to ensure the

vehicle is operated only by insured individuals, as well as 75 Pa.C.S. § 1574 (Permitting unauthorized person to drive), which provides, in part:

(a) General rule.--No person shall authorize or permit a motor vehicle owned by him or under his control to be driven upon any highway by any person who is not authorized under this chapter or who is not licensed for the type or class of vehicle to be driven. 75 Pa.C.S. § 1574(a). According to Safe Auto, under

possible coverage exclusion even those specifically permitted under the MVFRL such

6 Safe Auto emphasizes that, in the sentence in which the selected language appears, the Superior Court continues not to include specific language directing that all permissive users of a vehicle b [insurance Progressive Northern, 898 A.2d at 1119) (emphasis

omitted).

[J-104-2018] - 11 decision to reject coverage in exchange for reduced premiums a result directly at odds

w Id. at 16. Finally, Safe Auto observes that the legislature specifically identified situations in which coverage is required and/or cannot be limited, 7 and suggests that, if it had intended

that insurers provide mandatory liability coverage to all drivers of a vehicle, even those who do no would have clearly done so. 8 argument that the URDE in the

waived, as it was not raised before the Superior Court, and this Court did not grant review

of this issue. See Commonwealth v. Cash, 137 A.3d 1262, 1275 (Pa. 2016) (where a

defendant raises an objection before the trial court on specific grounds, only those grounds are preserved for appeal); Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (issues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal).

Next, in addition to the fact that Superior Court decisions are not binding on this Court, we are unpersuaded by Progressive Northern. In that case, t s son was in a motor vehicle accident while he was driving a vehicle loaned



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to the insured by a car dealership. At issue was which insurance carrier the carrier of the loaned vehicle's personal vehicle was required to provide liability coverage to the insured, and whether the policies, which

7 Safe Auto cites the following examples: 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 1711 and 1712 (listing various first-party benefits that must be offered), § 1724 (listing non-excludable conditions for first-party benefits), § 1731 (requirements for rejecting stacking of uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage), and § 1734 (requirement for selecting uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage in an amount equal to or less than the limits of liability). 8 In support of Safe Auto, the Casualty Insurers of America filed an amicus brief, and the Pennsylvania Defense Institute and the Philadelphia Association of Defense Counsel filed a joint amicus brief, both maintaining that the URDE does not violate Section 1786, or the public policy underlying the MVFRL.

[J-104-2018] - 12 be enforced. *Progressive Northern Ins.*, 898 A.2d at 1119. Unlike the instant case,

Progressive Northern did not involve a coverage exclusion. Moreover, to the extent the Superior Court in *Progressive Northern*, in determining interpreted

Section 1786 as requiring insurance coverage for all permissive users of a vehicle, we find such interpretation unsustainable. Requiring an insurer to provide coverage for an unlimited number of permissive users, including those who may be operating the vehicle

on a regular basis, but whom the insured has neither disclosed nor paid to insure, contravenes the accepted principle that insureds are not entitled to receive gratis coverage. Further, such an interpretation would almost certainly result in an increase in

the cost of insurance, as insurers would be forced to insure unknown risks. Finally, we reject Appellant's contention that the URDE violates the terms and provisions of subsections (a) and (f) of Section 1786 by requiring a vehicle owner to

identify all regular users, 9 that they are covered under an insurance policy. As noted above, Section 1786(a)

provides its title

Pa.C.S. § 1786(a). Section 1786(f) provides any owner of a motor vehicle for which

the existence of financial responsibility is a requirement for its legal operation shall not

operate the motor vehicle or permit it to be operated upon a highway of this Commonwealth without the financial responsibility required by this chapter. *Id.* § 1786(f).



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9 Although Appellants maintain that the URDE violates Sections 1786(a) and (f) by also requiring a vehicle owner to identify all occasional users only . Any such claim

is inapposite to this case as it is undisputed that Dixon was both a regular user of the

[J-104-2018] - 13 Plainly, Section 1786 does not require an owner to identify all permissive users of his vehicle; however, it also does not require an insurer to provide coverage beyond what the

insurance policy provides. Under its plain language, Section 1786 speaks to the obligations of the vehicle owner, not the insurer. Accordingly, we find that the URDE does not violate the MVFRL.

In their second issue, Appellants argue that the URDE in the Policy is contrary to the underlying public policy of the MVFRL, in that it under e number of uninsured motorists on Pennsylvania roadways, a

principle intended to protect the safety and security of all individuals traveling on In response, Safe Auto submits that Appellants are raising

at 23. Safe Auto further asserts that Appellants mischaracterize Williams v. GEICO Government Ins. Co., 32 A.3d 1195 (Pa. 2011), the principal case upon which they rely.

We reiterate that a party seeking to void an unambiguous provision in an insurance contract on public policy grounds bears a heavy burden, and that a determination of public policy must be based on the law, not simply on general considerations of supposed public

interest. See Williams, 32 A.3d at 1206. This Court previously has explained the basis for the MVFRL:

The repeal of the No-Fault Act and the enactment of the MVFRL reflected a legislative concern for the spiraling consumer cost of automobile insurance and the resultant increase in the number of uninsured motorists driving on public highways. The legislative concern for the increasing cost of insurance is the public policy that is to be advanced by statutory interpretation of the MVFRL. This reflects the -Fault

Act.

[J-104-2018] - 14 Paylor v. Hartford Ins. Co., 640 A.2d 1234, 1235 (Pa. 1994). While we have repeatedly recognized the goal of cost containment, we have

consistently observed that there is a balance to be struck between that goal and the remedial purpose of the MVFRL. In Eichelman, supra, the appellant was injured while driving his motorcycle covered by a policy without UIM coverage. Thereafter, he



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unsuccessfully sought UIM benefits under a separate policy issued to his parents, with whom he lived. His coverage for bodily injury suffered while occupying a motor vehicle not insured for UIM

coverage. Appellant sought to have the exclusion declared invalid on the basis of public policy. In upholding the exclusion, we explained:

[U]nderinsured motorist coverage serves the purpose of protecting innocent victims from underinsured motorists who cannot adequately compensate the victims for their injuries. That purpose, however, does not rise to the level of public policy overriding every other consideration of contract between premiums paid by the insured and the coverage the

Hall v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., [648 A.2d 755, 761 (Pa. 1994)]. Here, appellant voluntarily chose not to purchase underinsured motorist coverage. In return for this choice, appellant received reduced insurance premiums. . . . Thus, this Court concludes that furthers the legislative policy behind underinsured motorist coverage in the MVFRL since it will have the effect of holding appellant to his voluntary choice.

in this case is further bolstered by the intent behind the

MVFRL, to stop the spiralling costs of automobile insurance in s position were accepted, it would allow an entire family living in a single household with numerous automobiles to obtain underinsured motorist coverage for each family member through a single insurance policy on one of the automobiles in the household. If this result were allowed, it would most likely result in higher insurance premiums on all insureds (even those without family members

[J-104-2018] - 15 living at their residence) since insurers would be required to factor expanded coverage cost into rates charged for underinsured motorist coverage. Thus, allowing the at issue to bar recovery by appellant of underinsured motorist

benefits is consistent with the intent behind the enactment of the MVFRL.

711 A.2d at 1010. Subsequently, in *Burstein v. Prudential Property & Cas. Ins. Co.*, 809 A.3d 204 (Pa. 2002), we upheld a regular use, non-owned car exclusion of UIM coverage as non-

violative of public policy, explaining:

In light of the primary public policy concern for the increasing costs of automobile insurance, it is arduous to invalidate an otherwise valid insurance contract exclusion on account of that public policy. This policy concern, however, will not validate any and every coverage exclusion; rather, it functions to protect insurers against forced underwriting of unknown risks that insureds have neither disclosed nor paid to insure. Thus, operationally, insureds are prevented from receiving gratis



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coverage, and insurers are not compelled to subsidize unknown and uncompensated risks by increasing insurance rates comprehensively.

Here, voiding the exclusion would frustrate the public policy concern for the increasing costs of automobile insurance, as the insurer would be compelled to underwrite unknown risks that it has not been compensated to insure. Most significantly, if this Court were to void the exclusion, insureds would be empowered to regularly drive an infinite number of non-owned vehicles, and receive gratis UIM coverage on all of those vehicles if they merely purchase UIM coverage on one owned vehicle. The same would be true even if the insureds never disclose any of the regularly used, non-owned vehicles to the insurers, as is the case here. Consequently, insurers would be forced to increase the cost of insurance, which is precisely what the public policy behind the MVFRL strives to prevent. Such result is untenable. *Id.* at 208. Notwithstanding the above, and specifically citing the concurring opinions of several members of this Court in *Williams*,

[J-104-2018] - 16 recognized that the remedial goals of the MVFRL are equally important as the oft repeated goal *Williams*, a police officer was

seriously injured during the course of his employment while operating his police vehicle, for which he did not have the ability to obtain UIM coverage. *Williams* sought to recover UIM benefits from Geico, with whom he maintained a personal automobile insurance

policy, which included, inter alia, stacked UIM coverage with a limit of \$50,000 per person. - policy, which provided *Williams*, 32 A.3d at 1197

(citation omitted). -use exclusion,

this Court determined that the regular-use exclusion, as it applied to state troopers and other first responders, did not violate public policy. In so holding, we recounted the *Burstein* set forth above of the case were identical to those underlying *Burstein*, namely:

an employee injured while driving his employer-owned vehicle attempted to recover UIM benefits from his private insurer without compensating the insurer for that unknown risk. In overall policies of the MVFRL, which include cost containment

and the correlation between the scope of coverage and the reasonable premiums collected. Therefore, we reaffirm *Burstein* and hold that the regular-use exclusion is not void as against public policy. *Williams*, 32 A.3d at 1206 (citation omitted). Initially, we emphasize that, as evidenced by the above-quoted language of our

prior decisions, this Court has recognized that cost containment was a central goal of the MVFRL. It is true, however, that in our more recent decision in *Williams*, several Justices expressed in separate



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concurrences their opinion that cost containment should not be

[J-104-2018] - 17 viewed as the predominant goal of the MVFRL. Now-Chief Justice Saylor explained that policy concern of the [MVFRL], since the act clearly retained the core remedial objectives

Williams, 32 A.3d at 1210 (Saylor, J., concurring). However, Chief Justice Saylor concerns in

play, and the Legislature and the regulators have not spoken clearly on this issue, it appears to me that, rightly or wrongly, much latitude has been left to the insurance Id.

In his concurring opinion, Justice Baer [ed] , including Chief Justice Saylor, and then-Justice Orié Melvin, the author of the decision in Heller, supra, 10 who acknowledged -repeated policy of cost

containment Id. at 1210 (Baer, J., concurring). any further protection in the form of automobile insurance benefits must come from the

Id. at 1211.

Finally, this author, joined by then-Justice McCaffery, discussed the competing public policy concerns of remedial coverage and cost containment, but concluded that, not this Court. Id. at 1211 (Todd, J., concurring). Thus, while a majority of the members

of this Court have indicated that cost containment should not be considered the dominant public policy underlying the MVFRL, it is clear that it remains one of the policy concerns

to be considered.

10 In Heller, the Court explained: While the enactment of the MVFRL grew out of a legislative cost containment objective cannot be mechanically invoked

as a justification for every contractual provision that restricts coverage and purportedly lessens the cost of insurance. 32 A.3d at 1222.

[J-104-2018] - 18 In the instant case, the Policy contains a clear and unambiguous URDE, which excludes coverage for injury or property damage that occurred vehicle was operated by a resident of his household or by a regular user of his covered

vehicle, unless that person is listed as an additional driver on the Declarations Page. Although Policyholder did not dispute he was aware of this exclusion, he permitted his

vehicle to be operated by his live-in girlfriend, who, under the express terms of the URDE, was not



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covered by the Policy. Policyholder had the option of adding his girlfriend to the Policy, but chose not to do so. Undoubtedly, this choice resulted in reduced insurance

premiums, and, as we previously have stated, an insured is not entitled to receive gratis coverage. Moreover, in the absence of provisions in the MVFRL to the contrary, insurers are not compelled to underwrite unknown and uncompensated risks. Thus, we decline

to hold that the URDE in this case is contrary to public policy. For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the Superior Court. Order affirmed.

Chief Justice Saylor and Justices Baer, Donohue, Dougherty and Mundy join the opinion. Justice Wecht files a concurring opinion.

