

Devine v. Fusaro

2023 | Cited 0 times | Supreme Court of Connecticut | January 31, 2023

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The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the opinion as it appears in the Connecticut Law Journal and bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publica-tions, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. TIMOTHY DEVINE) v. LOUIS FUSARO, JR., ET AL. (SC 20633) Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D'Auria, Mullins and Ecker, Js. Argued November 22, 2022Dofficially released January 18, 2023* Procedural History Action to recover damages for the wrongful death of the plaintiff's decedent as a result of the defendants' alleged recklessness and gross negligence, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New Lon-don, wherethecourt, Knox, J., granted the defendants' motiontodismissandrenderedjudgmentthereon, from which the plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court, DiPentima, C. J., and Keller and Norcott, Js., which affirmed the trial court's judgment; thereafter, the AppellateCourtgrantedtheplaintiff'smotionforreconsideration; subsequently, the Appellate Court, Prescott, Cradle and DiPentima, Js., reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceed-ings, and the defendants, on the granting of certifica-tion, appealed to this court. Appeal dismissed. Michael K. Skold, deputy solicitor general, with whom, on the brief, were William Tong, attorney gen- eral, Clare Kindall, former solicitor general, Alayna M. Stone, associate attorney general, and Colleen B. Valentine, assistant attorney general, for the appel- lants (defendants). Trent A. LaLima, with whom was Virginia M. Gil-lette, for the appellee (plaintiff). Opinion PER CURIAM. On July 24, 2012, the decedent, Timo- thy Devine, fatally shot himself with a handgun after state police officers fired nonlethal ammunition at him in an unsuccessful effort to cause him to drop or to surrenderhisweapon. The plaintiff, Michael Devine, as administrator of the decedent's estate, 1

Devine v. Fusaro

2023 | Cited 0 times | Supreme Court of Connecticut | January 31, 2023

filedawrongful death action against four state police officers Dthe defendants, Louis Fusaro, Jr., Steven Rief, Michael Avery, and Kevin Cook Dalleging that their intentional, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct caused the death of the decedent. The defendants moved to dismiss the action, claiming that it was barred by the doctrine of sovereignimmunityor, alternatively, the statutory grant of immunity set forth in General Statutes §4-165. The trial court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, concluding that the plaintiff's action was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity pursuant to the four factortestsetforthinSpringv.Constantino,168Conn. 563, 568, 362 A.2d 871 (1975). See id. (articulating `the following criteria for determining whether [a] suit is, ineffect, one against the state and cannot be maintained without its consent: (1) a state official has been sued; (2)thesuitconcernssomematterinwhichthatofficial represents the state; (3) the state is the real party against whom relief is sought; and (4) the judgment, though nominally against the official, will operate to control the activities of the state or subject it to liability" (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Appellate Court reversed the judgment of the trialcourt, reasoning that the Spring test does not apply because the operative complaint unequivocally stated that ``[t]hedefendantsaresuedintheirindividualcapa- cit[ies]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)Devine v. Fusaro, 205 Conn. App. 554, 576, 259 A.3d 655 (2021); see id., 585. Alternatively, the Appellate Court deter- mined that the trial court misapplied the third factor of the Spring test because it ``was required to give far greater weight to the fact that the plaintiff specifically pleaded that he brought the action against the defen- dantsintheir individual capacities. "Id., 582±83. Accordingly, the Appellate Court reversed the trial court's judgmentandremandedthecasewithdirectionto ``con- sider the remaining ground raised in the motion [to dismiss], namely, whether the plaintiff's complaint sufficiently alleges reckless, wanton, or malicious conduct such that, if proven, the defendants would not be enti- tled to statutory immunity under §4-165." Id., 585. We granted the defendants' petition for certification to appeal,limitedtothefollowingissue: `DidtheAppellate Courtcorrectlyconcludethat, when acourt determines whether so vereign immunity bars a claim against state officials or employees for actions taken in the exercise oftheirduties, the [Spring] test . . . `hasnoapplicabil- ity' when a plaintiff designates that the state officials

oremployeeshavebeensuedintheirindividualcapaci- ties?" Devine v. Fusaro, 339 Conn. 904, 260 A.3d 1224 (2021). Afterexamining the entire record on appeal and con-sidering the briefs and oral arguments of the parties, we have determined that that the appeal should be

dismissed on the ground that certification was improvidently granted. The appeal is dismissed. *January 18, 2023, the date that this decision was released as a slip opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes. 1 The case captions in the trial court, the Appellate Court, and this court listMichaelDevine,inhisofficialcapacityastheadministratoroftheestate of the decedent, as the named plaintiff, but the summons and operative complaint listed the estate of the decedent as the named plaintiff. During oral argument before this court, the issue was raised whether the plaintiff had standing to invoke the subject matter jurisdiction of the courts given that an estate is not a legal entity capable of filing suit. Compare Estate of Rock v. University of Connecticut, 323 Conn. 26, 32, 144 A.3d 420 (2016) (``It is well established that an estate is not a legal representative. . .

Devine v. Fusaro

2023 | Cited 0 times | Supreme Court of Connecticut | January 31, 2023

. Not having legalexistence, it canneithersue norbesued." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)), with Estate of Brooks v. Commissioner of Revenue Ser- vices, 325 Conn. 705, 706 n.1, 159 A.3d 1149 (2017) (subject matter jurisdic- tion exists, despite naming estate as plaintiff, if action is maintained on behalf of estate by legal entity), cert. denied, U.S., 138 S. Ct. 1181, 200 L. Ed. 2d 314 (2018). Because we dismiss the certified appeal, we do not resolve this issue, but the parties and the trial court may address it on remand. See, e.g., Reinke v. Sing, 328 Conn. 376, 382, 179 A.3d 769 (2018) (`Subjectmatterjurisdictioninvolvestheauthorityofthecourttoadjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it. . . . The subject matter jurisdiction requirement may not be waived by any party, and also may be raised by a party, or by the court sua sponte, at any stage of the proceedings "(Internal quotation marks omitted.)).