



John Wesley Stout

2012 | Cited 0 times | E.D. Texas | May 2, 2012

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Petitioner John Wesley Stout, an inmate confined at the Connally Unit in Kenedy, Texas, proceeding pro se, brings this petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The petition was referred for findings of fact, conclusions of law and recommendations for the disposition of the case.

Background

Petitioner is challenging his Collin County conviction for burglary of a habitation, Cause No. 366-80491-03. He states that, on June 28, 2005, a jury convicted him and sentenced him to 30 years' confinement. The Fifth Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction on March 7, 2006, Cause No. 05-05-01064-CR. Petitioner did not file a petition for discretionary review.

The present petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed on May 12, 2011. Petitioner failed to specify the date that he placed the petition in the prison mailing system. However, the envelope is date-stamped May 10, 2011; thus, it is deemed filed on May 10, 2011, in accordance with the "mailbox rule." See *Spotville v. Cain*, 149 F.3d 374, 377 (5th Cir. 1998). Petitioner claims he is entitled to relief based on an illegal conviction, an illegal search and seizure, default judgment, and an illegal arrest. The Director was not ordered to file a Response.

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

On April 24, 1996, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) was signed into law. The law made several changes to the federal habeas corpus statutes, including the addition of a one year statute of limitations. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The AEDPA provides that the one year limitations period shall run from the latest of four possible situations: the date a judgment becomes final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; the date an impediment to filing created by the State is removed; the date in which a constitutional right has been initially recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. *Id.* at § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D). The AEDPA also provides that the time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation. *Id.* at 2244(d)(2).¹



In the present case, Petitioner is challenging his conviction. The appropriate limitations provision is § 2244(d)(1)(A), which states that the statute of limitations started running when the conviction became final. Petitioner did not file a petition for discretionary review; thus the conviction became final when the opportunity to file a petition for discretionary review had expired. He had thirty days after the court of appeals issued a decision to file a petition for discretionary review. Tex. R. App. Proc. 68.2(a). The Fifth Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction on March 7, 2006. Thus, the conviction became final on April 6, 2006, and the present petition was due no later than April 6, 2007, in the absence of tolling provisions. It was not filed until May 10, 2011 -- more than four years beyond the limitations deadline.

The United States Supreme Court recently confirmed that the AEDPA statute of limitation is not a jurisdictional bar, and it is subject to equitable tolling. *Holland v. Florida*, 560 U.S. -, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2560, 177 L. Ed.2d 130 (2010). "A habeas petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling only if he shows '(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way' and prevented timely filing." *Mathis v. Thaler*, 616 F.3d 461, 474 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting *Holland*, 130 S. Ct. at 2562). "Courts must consider the individual facts and circumstances of each case in determining whether equitable tolling is appropriate." *Alexander v. Cockrell*, 294 F.3d 626, 629 (5th Cir. 2002). The petitioner bears the burden of proving that he is entitled to equitable tolling. *Phillips v. Donnelly*, 216 F.3d 508, 511 (5th Cir. 2000).

The Fifth Circuit has held that the district court has the power to equitably toll the limitations period in "extraordinary circumstances." *Cantu-Tzin v. Johnson*, 162 F.3d 295, 299 (5th Cir.1998). In order to qualify for such equitable tolling, the petitioner must present "rare and exceptional circumstances." *Davis v. Johnson*, 158 F.3d 806, 810-11 (5th Cir.1998). In making this determination, it should be noted that the Fifth Circuit has expressly held that proceeding pro se, illiteracy, deafness, lack of legal training, unfamiliarity with the legal process, and claims of actual innocence are insufficient reasons to equitably toll the statute of limitations. *Felder v. Johnson*, 204 F.3d 168, 173 (5th Cir.2000).

As a general rule, equitable tolling has historically been limited to situations where the petitioner "has actively pursued his judicial remedies by filing a defective proceeding during the statutory period, or where the [petitioner] has been induced or tricked by his adversary's misconduct into allowing the filing deadline to pass." *Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs*, 498 U.S. 89, 96, 111 S. Ct. 453, 112 L. Ed.2d 435 (1990). Furthermore, equitable tolling cannot be used to thwart the intent of Congress in enacting the limitations period. See *Davis*, 158 F.3d at 811 (noting that "rare and exceptional circumstances" are required). At the same time, the Court is aware that dismissal of a first federal habeas petition is a "particularly serious matter, for that dismissal denies the petitioner the protections of the Great Writ entirely, risking injury to an important interest in human liberty." *Lonchar v. Thomas*, 517 U.S. 314, 324, 116 S. Ct. 1293, 134 L. Ed.2d 440 (1996).

In response to this Court's order concerning the timeliness of the petition, Petitioner filed a reply. In his reply, he simply reurges the issues raised in his petition and improvidently attempts to claim

equitable tolling based on a Texas state procedural matter. It is well-settled that habeas corpus relief is available only for "the vindication of rights existing under federal law." *Manning v. Warden*, 786 F.2d 710, 711 (5th Cir. 1986). In conclusion, Petitioner filed his petition more than four years beyond the limitations deadline, and he has failed to show either reasonable diligence or exceptional circumstances entitling him to equitable relief. Consequently, the petition should be dismissed as time-barred.

Certificate of Appealability

An appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from a final order in a proceeding under § 2254 "unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B). Although Petitioner has not yet filed a notice of appeal, it is respectfully recommended that this Court, nonetheless, address whether he would be entitled to a certificate of appealability. See *Alexander v. Johnson*, 211 F.3d 895, 898 (5th Cir. 2000) (A district court may sua sponte rule on a certificate of appealability because "the district court that denies a petitioner relief is in the best position to determine whether the petitioner has made a substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right on the issues before the court. Further briefing and argument on the very issues the court has just ruled on would be repetitious.").

A certificate of appealability may issue only if a petitioner has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). The Supreme Court fully explained the requirement associated with a "substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right" in *Slack v. McDaniel*, 529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S. Ct. 1595, 1603-04, 146 L. Ed.2d 542 (2000). In cases where a district court rejected a petitioner's constitutional claims on the merits, "the petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong." *Id.*; *Henry v. Cockrell*, 327 F.3d 429, 431 (5th Cir. 2003). "When a district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the petitioner's underlying constitutional claim, a COA should issue when the petitioner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling." *Id.*

In this case, it is respectfully recommended that reasonable jurists could not debate the denial of Petitioner's § 2254 motion on substantive or procedural grounds, nor find that the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed. See *Miller-El v. Cockrell*, 537 U.S. 322, 336-37, 123 S. Ct. 1029, 1039, 154 L. Ed.2d 931 (2003) (citing *Slack*, 529 U.S. at 484, 120 S. Ct. at 1604). Accordingly, it is respectfully recommended that the Court find that Petitioner is not entitled to a certificate of appealability as to his claims.

Recommendation



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It is accordingly recommended that Petitioner's motion for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 be denied and the case dismissed with prejudice. It is further recommended that a certificate of appealability be denied.

Within fourteen (14) days after receipt of the magistrate judge's report, any party may serve and file written objections to the findings and recommendations contained in the report.

A party's failure to file written objections to the findings, conclusions and recommendations contained in this Report within fourteen days after being served with a copy shall bar that party from de novo review by the district judge of those findings, conclusions and recommendations and, except on grounds of plain error, from appellate review of unobjected-to factual findings and legal conclusions accepted and adopted by the district court. *Douglass v. United Servs. Auto Ass'n*, 79 F.3d 1415, 1430 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).

1. The Fifth Circuit discussed the approach that should be taken in applying the AEDPA one year statute of limitations in *Flanagan v. Johnson*, 154 F.3d 196 (5th Cir. 1998) and *Fields v. Johnson*, 159 F.3d 914 (5th Cir. 1998).

