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### MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Jackie Monroe is a black male and a formeremployee of the defendant, Guardsmark, Inc. Plaintiff bringsthis action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 42 U.S.C.Sections 2000e et seq. The complaint alleges that plaintiff sdischarge from employment with Guardsmark was on the basis ofrace and this action was filed seeking monetary damages, injunctive and declaratory relief and reinstatement to redress defendant's alleged discriminatory employment practices. Jurisdiction of this case is pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1343.

Trial of this action, to the Court, commenced on January 28,1987. It was tried to a completion in two days and at the conclusion of the trial the Court orally pronounced its rulingfrom the bench in favor of the defendant Guardsmark. The Courthas since received defendant's proposed Findings of Fact andConclusions of Law and Judgment from the defendant and isprepared to enter its formal Opinion and Judgment. The Courtincorporates herein findings of fact and conclusions of lawpursuant to Rule 52, Fed.Rules of Civ.Pro.

The plaintiff, Jackie Monroe, is a black, male citizen of the United States currently residing in Ogden, Arkansas.

The defendant is Guardsmark, Inc. (Guardsmark), a Delawarecorporation licensed to do business in Arkansas, with itsprincipal place of business in Memphis, Tenn. The Guardsmarkoperations in Ashdown provided security and maintenanceservices for Nekoosa Papers, Inc. of Ashdown.

Jackie Monroe is a college graduate with a Bachelor of Artsdegree in history. Prior to his employment at Nekoosa Mr.Monroe worked as a substitute teacher in the Ashdown SchoolDistrict and part-time at the J.B. Davis General Store inAshdown. Mr. Monroe was hired by Guardsmark as a securityguard on June 8, 1982. He completed an orientation and training period and was assigned to a security guard positionin the Nekoosa plant at Ashdown.

During the time period Monroe was employed by Guardsmark, Guardsmark maintained in its personnel files a system of indexcards and notes which recorded the attendance of employees and disciplinary violations. At trial the parties submitted JointExhibit 7 as the file containing copies of such disciplinarynotations and attendance cards of Guardsmark employees during 1982 and 1983. Jackie Monroe was discharged by defendant onOctober 26, 1982, for failure to follow orders.

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On or about December 14, 1982, plaintiff filed a charge ofrace discrimination against Guardsmark with the EqualEmployment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). On or aboutSeptember 11, 1984 the EEOC issued a determination of havingfound reasonable cause to believe Mr. Monroe's charge wastrue. Conciliation attempts were unsuccessful and a Right toSue letter was issued to plaintiff on August 6, 1985. Plaintiff thereafter filed this action on September 6, 1985.

Plaintiff contends that defendant's decision to dischargehim on October 26, 1982, was racially discriminatory.Defendant asserts that plaintiff's discharge was for failure follow orders and that plaintiff's race played no part in the decision.

Plaintiff testified that he was subjected to harassment andracially derogatory language by white supervisory employees of the defendant. Testimony was offered from other employees andformer employees of Guardsmark in support of plaintiff's claimof disparate treatment of blacks by the defendant. Specifically, plaintiff contends that other white securityguards employed by Guardsmark violated the same rules and regulations as he and other black security guards had violatedbut the white employees were not disciplined as the blackemployees were.

During plaintiff's training with Guardsmark he received acopy of Guardsmark's General Orders, Rules and Instructions.Plaintiff was instructed as to such rules and regulations hewas required to follow as it was with every security employee.

In the file containing copies of the disciplinary and attendance cards of Guardsmark employees during 1982 and 1983(Joint Exhibit 7) there is noted a series of incidents whichtook place during the four and one-half months plaintiff wasemployed by defendant as follows:

(A) "Jackie Monroe called out, had it charged to 898-3808, at 12:30, he told me." This notation was signed by W.M. Smith;

(B) "Jackie Monroe was found in finishing computer office making outside phone calls. This makes the second time that he has been found in there instead of being on his post. Time found about 1:15 a.m., 7-19-82." Signed Sgt. Gene Mathis.

(C) An entry on 6-25-82 states, "Was instructed by Sgt. McCoy to return to Mill Patrol Post 10 at 5:10 a.m. He came in to clock out to fill out his daily report, waited for 6 a.m. shift change."

(D) On 6-27-82, an entry states, "Called in sick, face infected."

(E) On 7-19-82, there is an entry that Plaintiff was caught in the office of the computer room making a personal phone call by Sgt. Mathis at approximately 1:15. Monroe had the call charged to 898-3803 according to Mrs. W. Smith, post guard duty."

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(F) On August 2, 1982, the file contains a notation that Plaintiff was discovered by Sgt. Mathis on a third time "kicked back at the finishing department computer room desk."

(G) On August 2, 1982, Plaintiff Monroe was observed by Sgt. Dagenhart using the telephone in the No. 63 Paper Machine Control Room at 9:00. Monroe hung up the phone before Ms. Dagenhart reached him but in checking the call and log, the call was not for official business. He listed his 9:00 call from the fork lift on extension 257. According to the notation, three janitors were also in the room with him at the time. The notation contains a further comment that Plaintiff Monroe was observed by a G. Merrell entering the finishing department computer room at 11:10, however, he did not call in from there. Sgt. Dagenhart does not know how long Mr. Monroe remained in that room.

(H) On August 3, 1982, Plaintiff Monroe was observed sitting at a desk in the computer room/finishing department by Sgt. Mathis.

(I) On August 6, 1982, was caught with his eyes closed sitting in the No. 63 Paper Machine Control Room. The notation observed Mr. Monroe for three minutes before he opened his eyes: "I observed Mr. Monroe from 3:16 until 3:19 p.m., at this time he opened his eyes and saw me looking through the door at him. He got up, came out, and said he was sorry. I asked him if he knew the penalty for his infraction. He said, yes, I can be fired. I did not suspend Mr. Monroe for this, however, I gave him a verbal warning that he would be suspended for any future infraction of the rules. Mr. Monroe is working a double because of personnel shortages."

(I) On 8-5-82, Monroe was counselled about making required call in.

(J) On 9-29-82, Mr. Monroe was insubordinate with his field officer during his routine shift. This notation is initialed JB.

Testimony from the parties at trial centered on twoparticular incidents which occurred near the time ofplaintiff's discharge.

The first incident involved an altercation between plaintiffand one of his supervisors on September 29, 1982. Bothplaintiff and Sgt. Terrence J. Humphrey testified about theincident and recited different versions of what occurred.Plaintiff was at his duty station when he was approached bySgt. Humphrey and a confrontation ensued. Plaintiff testifiedthat Humphrey called him "boy" and "nigger." He stated thatHumphrey was standing over him "with (his) finger in (his)face" and "shouting racial slurs" at him. Plaintiff thenstated he got up from his chair, shoved Humphrey and ran outthe door of the guard's building, headed for the main gate.However, Sgt. Humphrey testified that he did not callplaintiff a "nigger" or direct any other racial or derogatoryremarks toward him. Humphrey stated that when he requested plaintiff to sign a report plaintiff refused and then grabbedHumphrey and shoved him backward. Plaintiff then ran out thedoor. Mr. Jim Bush, Guardsmark Unit Manager, was contacted byanother Guardsmark employee concerning the matter

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andconducted an investigation. Mr. Bush testified at trial thathe interviewed Mr. Monroe and Sgt. Humphrey in depthconcerning the incident. Bush's testimony again revealed howvery different the two versions of the incident were. Unableto confirm the credibility of either version Mr. Bush gave theplaintiff and Sgt. Humphrey a five-day disciplinarysuspension.

The final event which led to plaintiff's discharge occurredon or about October 23, 1982. It was revealed throughtestimony and evidence presented at trial that defendantGuardsmark had a rule or regulation which prohibited anon-duty guard from having his lunch brought to him by anyone, including off duty guards, while he was on duty. The lunchmust be left at a designated gate for the guard to come andpick up on a break or the lunch could be delivered to a guardon post by the sergeant or at the sergeant's direction. Astestimony indicated all employees, including plaintiff, werewell aware of this policy.

On October 23, 1982, Sergeant Joan Fleming and SergeantTrainee Cynthia Honeycutt discovered Dorothy Pree, an off-dutyguard at plaintiff's post. Ms. Pree had brought plaintiff'slunch to him at his post in violation of company policy. Ms.Fleming and Ms. Honeycutt both submitted written reports onthe incident to Mr. Bush. After a review of the reports Mr.Bush terminated plaintiff on October 26, 1982, for failure tofollow orders.

Several witnesses testified that they and other employees, both white and black, ignored or violated the company's policyin the same manner as plaintiff and Ms. Pree. Mr. Bushtestified that he was aware of this problem with violations of policy. However, he stated that he acted on every incidentwhere a violation of the rules was established through accurate information and documentation. Bush stated that hedid not base disciplinary action against employees on rumors, hearsay or speculation. As a result of Mr. Bush'sinvestigation of the October 23 incident both plaintiff Monroeand Ms. Pree were discharged.

During the course of the trial the EEOC investigatory fileon plaintiff's charge was admitted as plaintiff's exhibit no.1. Included in this file is a document listing theterminations by Guardsmark at the Nekoosa Papers plant betweenJuly 1, 1982 and January 31, 1983. This document cited thefollowing terminations during the relevant time period:Jenifer Abner, black, terminated August 30, 1982, forviolating company policy; Emma D. Berry, black, terminatedOctober 22, 1982 for falsifying records in violation ofcompany policy; Ray Boone, white, terminated January 13, 1983for violation of company policy; Shirley Burges, black,terminated for failure to follow orders; Dina Compton, black,terminated for leaving her post without proper leave orauthorization; Vicky Cox, black, terminated for attendanceproblems; GeorgiaFields, black, terminated for leaving her post without properleave or authorization; Arthur Gunn, white, terminated for failure to followinstructions; Arthur Jackson, black, terminated for attendanceproblems; Dorothy Lockaby, white, terminated for failure tofollow orders; Paula Mason, white, terminated for failure tofollow instructions; Arthur Jackson, black, terminated for attendanceproblems; Dorothy Lockaby, white, terminated for failure tofollow orders; Paula Mason, white, terminated for failure tofollow orders;

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Dorothy Pree, black, terminated for failure tofollow orders; Doyle Porter, white, terminated for insubordination and conduct unbecoming a security officer;Loretta Rowell, white, (reason for termination not shown onexhibit).

After careful review of the facts developed by the testimonyand evidence the Court now turns its attention to the lawapplicable to the case. It is well established that in orderto prevail on a charge of racial discrimination plaintiff hasthe burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence aprima facie case of discrimination. Texas Department ofCommunity Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). Plaintiff is required to establish thefollowing elements to meet the initial burden of proof:

(1) he belongs to a protected group;

(2)he was qualified for the position he was holding;

(3) he was discharged;

(4) other employees of similar qualifications were not discharged.

Judge v. Marsh, 649 F. Supp. 770 (D.C.D.C. 1986); McDonnellDouglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668(1973).

The Court concludes that plaintiff has met his initialburden of proof and established a prima facie case of racediscrimination. A prima facie case "raises an inference of discrimination only because we presume these acts if otherwiseunexplained are more likely than not based on the consideration of impermissible factors." Furnco ConstructionCompany v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 2949, 57L.Ed.2d 957 (1978).

Once a plaintiff has met his burden of establishing a primafacie case the burden shifts to the defendant to rebut thepresumption of discrimination by producing evidence of somelegitimate nondiscriminatory reason for discharging theplaintiff. The defendant has stated a legitimatenondiscriminatory reason for its decision to dischargeplaintiff. A review of the evidence and testimony presented bydefendant's witnesses supports reasoning that plaintiff wasdischarged for failure to follow orders. The Court isparticularly persuaded by the testimony of Mr. Bush,Guardsmark Unit Manager. The Court finds the defendant's actions with regard to plaintiff well supported and documentedby the testimony of Bush and the exhibits from the defendant'spersonnel file. Therefore, the Court is of the opinion thatdefendant has met its burden of articulating legitimatenondiscriminatory reasons for discharging plaintiff.

In accordance with the United States Supreme Court decisionin McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, supra, once adefendant articulates legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for he employment

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decision, the plaintiff must show the reasonsoffered are a pretext, that is a cover-up to conceal the realreasons. See also, Texas Department of Community Affairs v.Burdine, supra (1981).

At this stage, "the plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion. He now must have the opportunity to demonstrate that the professed reason was not the true reason for the employment decision. This burden now merges with the ultimate burden of persuading the Court he has been the victim of intentional discrimination. He may succeed in this either directly or indirectly by persuading the Court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's professed explanation is unworthy of credence."

Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, supra, 450U.S. at 256, 101 S.Ct. at 1095.

The Court recognizes that a security officer's job is animportant and a sensitive one. Rigid rules are required inconnection with this type of employment for the protection ofboth the employer and employee. The testimony and evidencepresented herein establish that plaintiff failed to follow therules and regulations concerning his position with defendant.

From a careful and considered review of the testimony andevidence presented the Court finds the plaintiff has failed toprove that the reason articulated by the defendant ispretextual. The complaint should therefore, be dismissed with prejudice.

A separate Judgment shall be entered contemporaneouslyherewith.